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Mind the Costs (of Rule of Law Initiatives), too: Assessing the Resource Challenges of Indonesian Anti-Corruption Efforts

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The law and development and comparative legal research literature have highlighted the importance of considering the efficiency of legal reform (or transplants) projects in developing countries. However, the existing literature on the efficiency assessment of rule of law programs is limited compared to the development program in health and education in Asia. This paper examines the Indonesian anti-corruption reform as part of broader Rule of Law initiatives, particularly focusing on the challenges posed by inadequate resources. During the Reformasi period, Indonesia introduced a range of anti-corruption policies, accompanied by the creation of new institutions aimed at curbing corruption. These reforms were largely supported by International Development Organizations (IDOs) and donors, whose involvement played a pivotal role in shaping and sustaining these initiatives. However, despite the institutional framework established and the support from international donors, the implementation of anti-corruption policies has faced significant hurdles. The lack of sufficient infrastructure, human capacity, and financial resources has been a central challenge in ensuring the effectiveness and sustainability of these reforms. Drawing on secondary sources, such as prior publications on Indonesian anti-corruption policies, as well as interviews with key actors involved in these projects, this paper highlights how the limited allocation of resources remains a key obstacle, impeding both the enforcement of anti-corruption laws and the operational efficiency of newly established agencies. Through the lens of Indonesia's anti-corruption efforts, this paper contributes to a broader understanding of the challenges that developing countries face in implementing reform-based development projects. These resourcing challenges suggest a lack of sustained political will to sustain the anti-corruption efforts, which was initially supported by the multilateral push. These insights provide further support for moderate or "good enough governance" reforms that are not too big, too much, and too fast, by considering the recipient country's political will, capacity, and resources.

Keywords: anti-corruption, law and development, Indonesia
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I. Introduction

After the Asian Financial Crisis and the collapse of the Soeharto regime in 1998, also known as the Reformation (*Reformasi*) era, the Indonesian government enacted several anti-corruption policies. At the beginning of the *Reformasi* era, the MPR issued the first decree regarding anti-corruption. The MPR Decree No. XI/ MPR/1998 on State Officials Who Are Free and Clean from Corruption, Collusion, and Nepotism determined the future of Indonesian anti-corruption policies (TAP MPR XI/1998). The MPR updated this decree by specifying the direction of anti-corruption policies in the MPR Decree no XIII/MPR/2001 on Policy Direction of Eradication and Prevention of Corruption (TAP MPR XIII/2001). This latter decree mandated both the Parliament and government to create laws concerning the following: (1) an anti-corruption agency; (2) Witness and Victim Protection Agency; (3) organized crime; (4) freedom of information; (5) government ethics; (6) crime of money laundering; and (7) the Ombudsman.

The Indonesian government passed the mandated laws and created new institutions to implement the laws; they enforce the crime of corruption laws via newly created institutions such as the Anti-Corruption Agency (KPK), Financial Intelligence Unit (PPATK), and Anti-Corruption Court. The existing law enforcement agencies, such as police and prosecutor offices, also formed specialized units with more resources than the other units within the agency. Moreover, the Indonesian government created several agencies to prevent corruption by promoting transparency and accountability, such as the Information Commission and the Ombudsman.

In creating and developing these institutions, the Indonesian government and NGOs received substantial support from IDOs or donors. The rule of law, anti-corruption, and good governance, with such underlying values as transparency and accountability, became the narratives behind the creation of those institutions. According to Belton (2005), this approach to creating new institutions is viewed as "measurable ends" by rule of law practitioners in the international development sector. These practitioners focus their projects on developing legal institutions that can improve the rule of law. For instance, Indonesia created a commercial court as "*a condition of the loans*" from the IMF in the commercial area (Mohr, 2007, pp. 41–59). Designing and developing institutions to implement an anti-corruption agenda became one of the legal reform priorities during the post-Soeharto era (McGuire, 2016, pp. 60–78).

This paper answers the questions: What is the resourcing challenge created by the multilateral push for anti-corruption measures in Indonesia after 1998? How do we assess the current state of resourcing for Indonesian anti-corruption policies? This paper introduces the readers to these issues by describing institutions, systems, regulations, and efforts to prevent and curb corruption in Indonesia as mandated by the TAP MPR XIII/2001 above and supported by IDOs or donors. This paper describes the Indonesian anti-corruption policies during the *Reformasi* period, including the newly created institutions that implemented these policies. This paper will also highlight the IDOs' role and involvement in creating these institutions to illustrate that these newly created institutions are part of law and development/anti-corruption projects.

For this paper, I used Brata (2014) categorization of the anti-corruption approaches to elaborate on Indonesian anti-corruption policies (e.g. preventive, repressive, and educational measures). However, this paper focuses on the former two: preventive and repressive measures. The reason for this is that the government creates no designated institution to implement the educational measures. Several newly created institutions tasked with prevention, such as the KPK and the Ombudsman, also have the authority to educate the public and agencies as part of the prevention strategy (Untung, 2024).

Next, this paper discusses the challenges – mainly the lack of resources, including infrastructure, human, and financial resources, to implement these policies based on secondary sources or previous publications regarding Indonesian anti-corruption policies. This discussion elaborates on one of the challenges in implementing and maintaining development projects using the Indonesian anti-corruption projects as a case study. Most of these anti-corruption institutions and programs did not work well because of the lack of resources. Scholars and donors have highlighted the limited resources as one of the problems that hamper the Indonesian government from implementing anti-corruption laws. This discussion answers lower order questions: What is the resourcing challenge created by the multilateral push for anti-corruption measures in Indonesia after 1997? (1.b.) How do we assess the current state of resourcing for Indonesian anti-corruption policies? (1.c.) This section aims to set the background and rationales for conducting a benefit-cost analysis of the Indonesian anti-corruption policies.

II. Preventive measures: new institutions to prevent corruption

The Indonesian government has taken preventive measures to eliminate or reduce opportunities to engage in corrupt behavior. Prevention has been a dominant strategy throughout the history of Indonesian anti-corruption policies. This section provides an overview of policies and institutions that aim to prevent corruption measures in the *Reformasi* era.

A. Wealth Audit Commission

In TAP MPR 1998, only one practical prevention strategy was stated in a decree: reviewing the public officials' wealth (income and assets) by an independent agency. The Parliament followed up the decree by enacting law No. 28 in 1999, which provides the fundamental legal framework for public officials to disclose their income and assets. This wealth disclosure effort was not a new strategy (Brata, 2014). In the first anti-corruption policies under the administration of Soekarno, this first Indonesian president required all public officials to declare their income and assets (The World Bank, 2013b).

Mandated by the TAP MPR 1998, in 1999, the Indonesian government created an independent agency called the Wealth Audit Commission (*Komisi Pemeriksa Kekayaan Penyelenggara Negara* or KPKPN). The agency was merged into a single department within the Corruption Eradication Commission (*Komisi Pemberantasan Korupsi* or KPK) when the government created this anti-corruption agency in 2004. This asset disclosure policy aimed to improve transparency, as mentioned in the handbook about wealth disclosure that the KPK published (Komisi Pemberantasan Korupsi, 2015). The KPK claims that transparency could increase public trust in the government. Reciprocally, government officials could also be responsible and respectful to the public when doing their job (Komisi Pemberantasan Korupsi, 2015). I will elaborate on the history and rationales of KPK creation later in the section regarding repressive measures, because the KPK has both preventive and repressive tasks and authority.

B. Information Commission

In the beginning, the Indonesian civil society organization (CSO) activists also successfully promoted freedom of information regulation within the Indonesian Supreme Court, which issued a regulation to ensure and provide public information in 2007. The CSO activists and the Supreme Court officials received support in the regulation-making process from such international donors as the Indonesia-Australia Legal Development Facility (LDF) and USAID/Millennium Challenge Corporation (Cox, Duituturaga, Sholikin, 2012, p. 39). The UNDP deemed this regulation one of the best practices to prevent corruption in the judiciary (Schütte, Reddy, Zorzi, 2016, p. 38). The IMF also advocated transparency to prevent corruption (Poverty Reduction and Economic Management Unit and The World Bank East Asia and Pacific Region, 2003).

Promoting transparency in the judiciary allowed human rights and anti-corruption activists, with the support of IDOs, to push the legislation process for the Public Information Law (Kamil, 2007; Masduki, 2010, pp 17–28). This law is mandated by the TAP MPR XIII/2001. The Parliament enacted this law in 2008 to ensure every person's right to communicate and obtain information. The law broadens public access to the information held by every institution that receives government funding and non-government organizations funded by either community or foreign sources. Human rights activists consider this law as a protection and guarantee for public civil and political rights according to the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, and anti-corruption activists deem transparency and access to public documents, particularly the public budget, as prerequisite criteria to curb corruption.

Transparency is interrelated with accountability. The Indonesian government established several institutions to uphold accountability among its agencies and officers to promote good governance. As for the Public Information Law, a new institution, the Information Commission (*Komisi Informasi*) ensures its implementation. The Information Law requires the government to create one central Commission and 34 provincial Information Commissions. This Commission has the authority to settle disputes between the public and institutions regarding access to public information.

C. Ombudsman

In addition, the Indonesian government created the Ombudsman to promote good governance and anti-corruption at the beginning of the *Reformasi* era under Presidential Decree No. 4 Year 2000 (Crouch, 2007, pp. 1–30). This law was mandated by the TAP MPR XIII/2001. The legal basis for the Ombudsman then changed with the Law of 38 the Year 2008. The idea to create this oversight institution can be traced back to the 1970s. Two Indonesian legal scholars, Satjipto Rahardjo and Muchsan (Harijanti, 2020, p. 4), proposed an institution that could ensure that the government operates according to the law. Despite the legal basis of the Ombudsman having been changed since its first iteration, the Ombudsman has two main goals: 1) promoting good governance that is fair, just, open, and free from corruption, collusion, nepotism, and discrimination, and 2) improving public services. The Ombudsman has the authority to receive public complaints, investigate the complaints, and report the investigation results to other related institutions. Like the Information Commission, the Ombudsman also has regional offices in 34 provinces in Indonesia (Ombudsman, 2024).

The CSO, alongside IDOs, supported the creation of this oversight institution. Crouch documented the establishment of the first local Ombudsman in the Yogyakarta province (Crouch, 2007, pp. 1–30). She described the support from local CSOs, *Kemitraan* (Partnership for Governance Reform), and *Pusham UII* (Human Rights Study Center at the Islamic University of Indonesia), in creating an Ombudsman in Yogyakarta (Sherlock, 2002, pp. 367–383). *Kemitraan* and *the Asia Foundation* supported the first national Ombudsman in 2000. These organizations supported financial and expert resources to set up, develop, and operate the Ombudsman office (Sherlock, 2002, pp. 367–383).

D. National Public Procurement Agency (LKPP)

UNODC considers that "*public procurement is a major risk area for corruption*." Many countries, including Indonesia, have tried to curb corruption in public procurement (United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime. 2020). In 2001, the World Bank published the *Indonesia Country Procurement Assessment Report: Reforming the Public Procurement System*. This report reviewed the public procurement laws and practices in Indonesia; it also provided several reform proposals to improve the Indonesian public procurement system based on international principles (The World Bank, 2013a). This report highlighted the benefits of establishing the National Public Procurement Office, such as providing modern and internationally accepted policies in public procurement (The World Bank, 2013a, p. 13).

The effort to reform Indonesian public procurement started at the beginning of the *Reformasi* period (Djojosoekarto, 2009). President Abdurrahman Wahid issued Presidential Decision Number 18 Year 2000 regarding Public Procurement Guidance. This regulation promotes open, accountable, transparent, and fair public procurement. The Indonesian government then committed to the Consultative Group for Indonesia (CGI), a group of international development agencies, to create the National Public Procurement Office (LKPP) (Badan Perencanaan dan Pembangunan Nasional, 2007). Based on President Regulation Number 106 Year 2007, the Indonesian government created the National Public Procurement Agency (*Lembaga Kebijakan Pengadaan Barang/Jasa Pemerintah*, hereafter LKPP, 2024). The LKPP is tasked with developing and drafting public procurement policies in Indonesia and has become a driving force in reforming the Indonesian public procurement system, improving it overall (Wibowo, 2017).

One of its efforts is the electronic procurement system (e-procurement) mandated by Presidential Regulation Number 54 Year 2010 regarding Public Procurement. In 2011, the LKPP issued guidance to regulate electronic public procurement in Indonesia. Moreover, the LKPP develops and manages the Electronic Public Procurement System (*Sistem Pengadaan Secara Elektronik* or SPSE), first developing this electronic procurement system (e-procurement) in several provinces and agencies in 2007. The LKPP, with the support of *Kemitraan* and Millenium Challenge Corporation-USAID, bought hardware and software to create e-procurement in five provinces in Indonesia.

This e-procurement could minimize fraud and corruption in public procurement (Puspita, Gultom, 2024, pp. 117–129; Wibowo, 2015, pp. 37–60). Before its existence, vendors were required to submit their proposals in person. Some people obstructed the submission process so that certain vendors would be eliminated from the tender process. E-procurement helps remove barriers for vendors to participate in tender by simplifying the process (Haryati, Anditya, Wibowo, 2011, pp. 328–342). There are at least two benefits of e-procurement for public officials. First, this system simplified the process and reports that public officials must administer (Wibowo, 2021). Second, this system helps public officials who previously have been threatened to choose a particular vendor to refuse to pick vendors who do not participate in the e-procurement system.

E. National Strategy of Corruption Prevention and Eradication

Besides creating new institutions such as the the KPK, the Information Commission, and the Ombudsman, the Indonesian government also designed and implemented the National Strategy of Corruption Prevention and Eradication (*Strategi Nasional Pencegahan dan Pemberantasan Korupsi* hereafter the *Stranas* PK). Historically, President Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono issued this strategy during his first administration term (2004–2009). After ratifying the United Nations Convention Against Corruption (UNCAC) in 2006, *Stranas* PK was updated during every president's term to harmonize the president's agenda on anti-corruption and UNCAC mandates (Australia Indonesia Partnership for Justice, 2010). This anti-corruption strategy consists of programs and indicators that several national and local agencies must implement and achieve.

For instance, one of the current strategies focuses on reforming the licensing and procurement process to curb corruption in the business sector. To achieve that goal, several agencies, such as the Ministry of Law and Human Rights, the National Procurement Agency (LKPP), and the Ministry of Investment, need to utilize the Beneficial Ownership regulation to prevent corruption. The transparency of the beneficial owner of a company (beneficial ownership) has developed as one of the important policies to fight corruption, track the flow of illegal money, and fight tax avoidance so the government can identify quickly individuals who have benefits and are responsible for the business carried out by the company (Inter-American Development Bank and Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development, 2019).

Some IDOs, such as UNODC, the ADB, and the Publish What You Pay (PWYP), have supported and developed the Beneficial Ownership policy in Indonesia (Chhina, 2022; Ramadhan, 2020; United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime, 2021).

To implement *Stranas* PK, the Indonesian government has placed the KPK as its coordinator since 2019. Before that, the Ministry of Planning and Development (*Bappenas*) was the agency that managed *Stranas* PK. *Bappenas* also worked collaboratively with international donors and CSOs, so their support aligns with the national development plan, including the national anti-corruption strategy (Isro, 2022). In implementing *Stranas* PK, these development partners have supported the program by providing financial or technical assistance. Such donors as the UNDP, USAID, AIPJ (AusAID), GIZ, and the World Bank are still involved in and support *Stranas* PK's implementation during the current management at the KPK (Sekretariat Nasional Pencegahan Korupsi, 2020, p. 96). The KPK has a budget for managing *Stranas* PK, mainly for managerial and coordination tasks. Budgets to implement *Stranas* PK are within each agency mandated to execute the anti-corruption program. Unfortunately, these budgets do not appear in each agency's annual financial plan and report because they are internalized in the ordinary operational budget.

III. Repressive measures: new institutions to enforce the Anti-Corruption Laws

Repressive measures aim to detect corrupt behavior and then to prosecute and punish violators; this enforcement also aims to deter potential offenders. Investment in law enforcement agencies represents the "fourth wave" and "fifth wave" of the rule of law assistance that focuses on the judiciary, law enforcement, and correction (O'Connor, 2015). Law enforcement agencies are an essential and integral part of upholding and enforcing the rule of law among public officials who violate the law (Sandgren, 2005, pp. 717–731). Belton (2005) also noted that "good" law enforcement has become one of the goals of rule of law practitioners. This strategy, focusing on law enforcement reform, can promote other ends of the rule of law, such as equality before the law and impartial justice (Belton, 2005).

Creating an anti-corruption agency, for instance, aims to supplement or replace the existing law enforcement agencies that are prone to corrupt practices. Sousa (2010, pp. 5–22) surveyed that the "*governments, donors, and international governmental organizations (IGOs)*" supported creating specialized anti-corruption agencies in many countries. In Indonesia, the Australia-Indonesia Partnership for Justice (AIPJ) is an example of the rule of law project that focuses on improving law enforcement to investigate and prosecute corruption crimes (Bosch, 2016, p. 118). During the first period of AIPJ work (2011–2016), it considered the need to improve the KPK and the Attorney General Office's work in prosecuting corruption crimes (Australia-Indonesia Partnership for Justice, 2010, p. 26). The The AIPJ (2010, p. 26) also promoted transparency at the Attorney General Office by supporting its first publicly available Annual Report. In its second period, the AIPJ supported the KPK and local CSO *Pusat Studi Hukum dan Kebijakan* (PSHK) to publish the guidelines for money laundering case management in the capital market (Australia-Indonesia Partnership for Justice 2, 2018, p. 6).

A. Corruption Eradication Commission (*Komisi Pemberantasan Korupsi*/KPK)

In the initial period of *Reformasi*, President Wahid created a joint anti-corruption task force that consisted of law enforcement officers such as police and prosecutors, public representation, scholars, and the State Auditor (Tempo, 2005). The Attorney General led this task force before it was determined to be unlawful according to the Supreme Court in 2001 (Mudzakkir, 2011). After dissolving the task force based on the Supreme Court decision, the Indonesian government created an anti-corruption agency based on Law Number 30 Year 2000 regarding the KPK. This anti-corruption agency has repressive authorities to investigate and prosecute crimes of corruption. Creating the KPK and giving law enforcement authority is necessary because the police and prosecutorial offices "*have not been functioning effectively and efficiently in eradicating corruption*." The enforcement power is typical for the newly created anti-corruption agencies worldwide, such as in South America, and some provinces in Australia, Africa, East Asia, and Southeast Asia (Rotberg, 2017, p. 119). The KPK also supervises other law enforcement agencies, monitors government programs, and prevents corruption.

Schütte (2012, pp. 38–48) illustrated donors' contribution to the KPK law's legislation process (Schütte, 2012). The Asian Development Bank (ADB) supported the technical assistance draft of the bill. At the same time, the IMF also recommended the creation of an anti-corruption body as a priority and prerequisite to receiving the IMF fund (Schütte, 2012, pp. 38–48). The United Nations Convention Against Corruption (UNCAC) also requires each country that ratified the convention to establish an anti-corruption body (Ratification..., 2006). Juwono (2014, pp. 1–18) listed all 14 international donors that supported the creation and early period of the KPK as of 2005. The local CSOs that participated most in advocating and supporting the creation of the KPK are *Kemitraan*, the Indonesia Corruption Watch (ICW), and *Masyarakat Transparansi Indonesia* (MTI) (Setiyono, McLeod, 2010, pp. 347–370). Their support was in the form of a public campaign, research publication, and a parliamentary lobby. After creating the KPK, *Kemitraan* and MTI also assisted in the first KPK leadership selection process (Setiyono, McLeod, 2010, pp. 347–370). Through quantitative and qualitative analysis of Indonesian CSOs' role and influence, Silvia-Leander (2015) found that "*the main influencing path for CSOs to achieve policy influence is through public opinion, alliance with formal decision-makers and pressure*."

Some scholars have hailed the KPK as one of Indonesia's successes in anti-corruption reform. Schütte (2012, pp. 38–48), for instance, claimed that the "*KPK has brought previously untouchable high-profile perpetrators to jail, has recovered stolen assets, and enjoys a much higher degree of public trust and support than the other Indonesian law enforcement agencies*." The KPK has prosecuted the Speaker of the Indonesian House Representatives, the Chief of Constitutional Court Justice, governors, mayors, ministers, leaders of political parties, police generals, prosecutors, and prison wardens. The KPK achieved high prosecution and conviction rates in its first six years (Choi. 2011, pp. 45–63). In 2021, the Indonsia Corruption Watch (2020) published that the KPK, on average, prosecuted offenders for longer sentences than the AGO. From the comparison of monetary sanctions collected by the KPK and the AGO, the KPK tended to prosecute grand corruption cases with the offenders of high-ranking public officials (Ramadhan, 2022). One of the reasons is that the KPK law mandates this anti-corruption agency to prosecute the crime of corruption that involves (1) law enforcement officers and high-ranking officials, (2) public attention, or (3) state financial loss of at least IDR 1 billion (USD 75,000). Although the AGO can prosecute any corruption crime, the case selection has raised public criticism. The ICW has complained that the AGO primarily prosecuted the "operator" of corrupt government projects, such as low-rank public officials, heads of villages, and private companies (Alamsyah, Abid, Sunaryanto, 2018). The ICW criticized the AGO failure to explore the evidence and develop the cases to prosecute individuals with a strategic position and authority to plan the crime of corruption. The AGO also rarely combines the prosecution of corruption crimes with money laundering crimes; if they did, it could potentially increase the collection of monetary sanctions (Alamsyah, Abid, Sunaryanto, 2018).

The KPK has more independence and public support than law enforcement agencies like the Indonesian Police and the AGO. The president does not select or appoint KPK leaders. The five leaders of the KPK are selected through a committee set up by the government that consists of government representatives and public and academic representatives. This committee invites the CSO and media to provide additional background checks and oversight of the interview process (Schütte, 2011, pp. 355–379). The committee shortlists candidates and then sends the lists to the Parliament. Next, the Parliament conducts a "fit and proper" process to select KPK leaders. This sequential selection process does not jeopardize the independence of KPK leaders from a particular executive or legislative power (Schütte, 2011, pp. 355–379).

B. Anti-Corruption Court

Simultaneously, under the KPK Law (2002), Indonesia created its Anti-Corruption Court in 2004. The public demanded an independent, impartial, and competent judiciary to examine corruption cases because of distrust of the corrupt judiciary. Unlike the anti-corruption agency, UNCAC does not mandate or recommend that countries establish specialized courts to examine cases of crime of corruption. UNODC acknowledges the importance of judicial integrity to combat corruption; therefore, "strengthening judicial institutions" became one of their anti-corruption strategies. With this strategy, UNODC argued that fair and consistent judicial decisions could deter crime of corruption defendant (United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime, 2004).

The IDO that also influences the judicial reform narrative is the World Bank. The World Bank has been involved in "judicial reform" projects since the 1960s, with an increased effort in the 1990s (Ofosu-Amaah, 2017, pp. 551–581). Before the enactment of UNCAC, the World Bank published a framework to evaluate anti-corruption policies in 2000 (Huther, Shah, 2000). One of the strategies to improve the probability of punishment is to strengthen judicial integrity and performance by providing adequate resources and ensuring its independence (Huther, Shah, 2000). The World Bank supported the creation of the ACC in Ukraine and Indonesia as a strategy to improve court independence in examining crime of corruption cases (Zabokrytskyy, 2020, pp. 1–12). Since 2003, there have been newly created anti-corruption courts (ACC) in 23 countries. In 2022, 27 countries had a specialized anti-corruption court. The number of ACCs has increased since the enactment of UNCAC.

Some scholars reported positive outcomes of ACC creation; one reported that an ACC is influential in attracting and increasing US foreign direct investment. One plausible reason for this is that ACCs ensure US firms create a level playing field with local companies by improving judicial independence and the probability of punishment to companies that commit crimes of corruption. The proceeding also achieved by the Uganda Anti-Corruption Court resulted in an expedited process when examining the crime of corruption cases (Stephenson, Schütte, 2016). The result also occurred in other ACCs, like those in the Philippines and Indonesia. These expediency results inspired other countries like Zambia to consider establishing an ACC (Kashala, 2017, pp. 1–14).

The Indonesian Anti-Corruption Court's establishment brought hope toward eradicating the rampant corruption in Indonesia (Damanik, 2005). Stephenson and Schütte identified three reasons for the establishment of an anti-corruption court in several countries, including Indonesia: (1) efficiency, (2) integrity, and (3) expertise. Because of the need for expertise and the general distrust of a career judge's integrity, the Indonesian Anti-Corruption Court has external judges, known as ad hoc judges, to sit with the career judges in examining and deciding the crime of corruption cases (Suhendra, 2002). These ad hoc judges would also know the law and other specialties to help examine corruption cases. For instance, financial, tax, and banking expertise might help unveil the modus operandi of corruption crime. Some scholars argue that ad hoc judges represent the public because they offer the "people's voice" to the criminal proceedings of corruption crime (Tim Taskforce, 2008, p. 43).

In 2004, the first Indonesian Anti-Corruption Court was located only in Jakarta. It only adjudicated corruption cases prosecuted by the KPK. This anti-corruption agency and the Anti-Corruption Court achieved a 100% conviction rate on more than 100 cases (Butt, 2012, p. 146). Because of this achievement, the the ICW considered the Anti-Corruption Court as a *kuburan koruptor* (cemetery for corruptors) (Purwadi, 2011). Butt argued that two aspects arguably influenced this astonishing result in the first period of an anti-corruption court (2004–2010) (Butt, 2012, p. 146). First, all cases brought to the Anti-Corruption Court were investigated and prosecuted by a high-quality prosecutor at the newly created KPK with better remuneration and a lighter caseload compared prosecutors from the National Police and Attorney General Office (Komisi Pemberantasa Korupsi, 1991; MacMillan, 2011; CRN, 2007). Second, the "mandated majority" of the ad hoc judges represented a significant factor in an anti-corruption court performance (Butt, Schütte, 2014, pp. 603–619). In examining a corruption case, there should be three ad hoc judges compared to two ordinary judges.

C. Specialized prison

Indonesia has also been experimenting with a special prison for locking up the defendants convicted of crimes of corruption since 2012. This prison idea is not new; the Dutch built one in 1918 to lock up common criminals and resistance group members who broke Dutch law (Syahrial, 2022). Denny Indrayana, then a Deputy Minister of Law and Human Rights, initiated an idea to relocate all defendants found guilty of corruption crimes to the *Sukamiskin* prison in West Java. He believed that it would be easier to supervise all inmates because "*one [prison] cell [would be used by] one person*" (Gandhi, 2012).

The Ministry of Law and Human Rights has worked closely with the Asia Foundation (TAF) to reform the correctional system from its corrupting practice. TAF supported the development of the correctional database system (*sistem database pemasyarakatan* hereafter SDP), which contains information about the number of inmates, capacity, staff, and budget for every jail and prison in Indonesia. Transparency became the primary goal of this program. The Ministry and TAF believed this program would improve the quality of services in jail and prison by promoting transparency. This system aids the Ministry in detecting the jails and prisons that need resources the most and then allocating the resources accordingly. TAF initiated the program by procuring the hardware and developing the system (Direktorat Jenderal Pemasyarakatan, 2024). The Ministry, with its resources, maintains the program. TAF also assisted the Ministry in developing a standard operating procedure that complies with corruption-free zone guidance published by the Ministry of Administrative and Bureaucratic Reform. TAF also trained the prison staff, including the Sukamiskin prison staff, to implement and comply with the newly created procedure.

D. The State Auxiliary Agencies supporting Law Enforcement Agencies

The Indonesian government has also created several state auxiliary agencies to reform and support the existing law enforcement agencies. The term "auxiliary" is used in most Indonesian legal publications to define these agencies' roles as supporting institutions (Abdillah et al., 2020, pp 67–81). Their duty is not to enforce the law but to support the existing law enforcement agencies in preventing and enforcing crimes of corruption. These agencies are the Judicial Commission (*Komisi Yudisial*, hereafter KY), Prosecutorial Commission, Police Commission, Centre for Financial Transactions Reporting and Analysis (PPATK), and Witness and Victim Protection Agency (LPSK).

i. Judicial Commission (*Komisi Yudisial*)

In 2000, the Indonesian Institute for Independent Judiciary (*LEIP*), a CSO, proposed the creation of the KY (Faiz et al, 2013, p. 19). The LEIP, arguing that the KY must create "*an effective control*" over the Supreme Court, which has gained considerable power and independence since *Reformasi* (Faiz et al, 2013, p. 19). Historically, the Supreme

Court was under the Ministry of Justice and Human Rights. This agency had power for judicial appointments, training, promotions, dismissals, court finances, and infrastructure (Lindsey, 2004). Thus, the government could intervene easily in judicial authority because of a lack of judicial independence. In 2001, the Indonesian Parliament amended the Indonesian Constitution to include the provision on the KY (Komisi Yudisial, 2004).

The plan to create a Judicial Commission was elaborated on in one of the 2003 Supreme Court Blueprints chapters. The LEIP assisted the Supreme Court in writing the blueprints (Ramadhan, 2017, pp. iii–iv). This blueprint serves as a comprehensive plan to identify and plan for judicial reforms project (The World Bank, 2003a). Pompe (2005) argued that the role of CSOs should not be undermined in the Indonesian judicial and legal reform process. The Supreme Court Chief Justice acknowledged the engagement of the LEIP and other CSOs as participants in the judicial reform process (Pompe, 2005). The CSO's involvement in the judicial reform process, including the publication of blueprints, was supported by international donors because the Supreme Court could not receive financial assistance in cash (Pompe, 2005). Therefore, the international donors' support to publish blueprints, train judges, and develop the system was "*channeled through relevant*" CSOs to implement such programs.

The KY has tasks to (1) screen and propose Supreme Court Justices, (2) uphold the judges' nobility, (3) create a code of ethics and conduct for judges, and (4) enforce the code of ethics and conduct (Komisi Yudisial, 2004). The KY was created to improve judicial accountability because the judiciary is essential in achieving the rule of law (Crouch, 2019, pp. 1–28; Falaakh, 2014). The KY is an institution outside of the Supreme Court because many reformers and the public do not trust the Supreme Court to implement the tasks mentioned above (Lindsey, 2004; Masyarakat Pemantau Peradilan Indonesia dan Komisi Hukum Nasional, 2002). In its 2018 report, the the KY claimed it had conducted 16 Supreme Court Justices' selection processes since 2006 (Sahbani, 2018). Fifty-eight Supreme Court Justices were appointed via this process. The KY collaborated with the press and CSOs to scrutinize candidates' profiles in this process and also consistently recommends sanctions for judges who violate the code of ethics and conduct (Susanto, 2017, pp. 1–17). In 2021, the the KY gave sanctions to 85 judges and 130 judges in 2019 (Festy, 2021). If the judges allegedly committed the crime of corruption, the KY would report this allegation and its investigation to KPK (Hari, 2014). Moreover, the KY trained thousands of judges to improve their skills and knowledge (Priskilla, Noer, 2020).

ii. Police and Prosecutor oversight

After creating the Judicial Commission, the MaPPI FHUI (a CSO) worked with the Ombudsman and the National Legal Commission (*Komisi Hukum Nasional* or KHN), proposing that the government and the Parliament create a commission to supervise and support the prosecutor and the police in 2002 (Zae, 2002). Their idea was to expand the Judicial Commission's authority to deal with the ethical violations committed by the prosecutors and the police (Zae, 2002). The reasoning behind the creation of these three institutions is similar: the internal supervision or monitoring in the existing law enforcement agencies (Supreme Court, AGO, and National Police) was ineffective due to partiality, low professionalism, and weak monitoring systems (Assegaf, Syarifah, 2006).

The government and the Parliament had different ideas about supporting prosecutor and police work. The Parliament enacted the Police Law 2002 and Prosecutor Law 2004, giving legal mandates for the president or the government to create the Prosecutorial and Police Commission. The government then established these commissions in 2005 with the Presidential Regulation. These commissions do not enjoy the same independence as the Judicial Commission because their budgets, recruitments, and administration are under the president, particularly through the Coordinating Ministry for Political, Legal, and Security Affairs (Anw/Gun, 2011).

Each commission has the authority to receive public complaints on police and prosecutor misconduct, respectively (Ramadhan, 2013, pp.1–14; Warsyin, 2023, pp. 130–152). They also have the task of evaluating and making policy recommendations to improve prosecutor and police work (Ramadhan, 2013, pp.1–14; Warsyin, 2023, pp. 130–152). Unlike the Information Commission and the Ombudsman, neither the Prosecutorial Commission nor the Police Commission have regional offices.

Both commissions received support from the CSOs and IDOs to develop their monitoring system and evaluate prosecutor and police work. From 2011 to 2015, the AIPJ supported the Prosecutor Commission to draft five internal regulations and train its staff (Komisi Kejaksaan, 2012). The Police Commission also received similar support in 2008 when *Kemitraan* assisted the commission in creating a guideline to handle public complaints on police misconduct (Arya Bangga et al., 2008). The Police Commission also worked with IDOs such as the International Organization for Migration (IOM) and the Asia Foundation (TAF), to conduct training in community policing and human rights (IOM Indonesia, 2007).

The national CSOs have also advocated creating a financial intelligence unit to detect and trace the money resulting from crimes (Setiyono, 2010). The CSOs' strategy included proposing policy drafts, lobbying the Parliament, and organizing public support (Setiyono, 2010). In 2002, Indonesia created the financial intelligence unit, the Centre for Financial Transactions Reporting and Analysis (*Pusat Pelaporan dan Analisis Transaksi Keuangan* or PPATK). This creation was also part of the TAP MPR XIII/2001 mandate. The PPATK is an independent agency similar to the KPK. Eddy referred to the "*distinct preference for so-called independent bodies and commissions*" during the *Reformasi* era as one of the reasons to set the PPATK as an independent agency (Eddy, 2005).

The PPATK has the authority to prevent and eradicate the crime of money laundering. Despite the eradication or enforcement task, the center does not have the authority to investigate and prosecute a person who committed money laundering. The center, however, could participate in the investigation process by recommending that the investigator intercept the electronic information related to the financial transaction. Moreover, the center has the authority to mandate that financial service institutions stop suspicious transactions.

The PPTAK works mainly with the money laundering that goes hand in hand with the crime of corruption. In 2019, there were 251 Analysis Reports (*Laporan Hasil Analisis*, hereafter LHA) regarding the crime of corruption from 631 reports by the PPATK (Pusat Pelaporan dan Analisis Transaksi Keuangan, 2020). The crime of corruption was also the major source of money laundering analyzed, 206 of 523 reports by the PPATK in 2020 (Pusat Pelaporan dan Analisis Transaksi Keuangan, 2021). The PPATK made these reports based on complaints and information about suspicious financial transactions. The PPATK then sent the reports to law enforcement agencies to investigate them further. Also, the PPATK received requests from law enforcement agencies to examine suspicious financial transactions. Law enforcement agencies need the Examination Report (*Laporan Hasil Pemeriksaan*, hereafter LHP) to complete their investigation process. The KPK is the law enforcement agency that requested the most LHPs from the PPATK. The PPATK provided 11 of 24 LHP to the KPK in 2019 and 8 of 25 LHP in 2020 Pusat Pelaporan dan Analisis Transaksi Keuangan, 2020; 2021). These numbers indicate that the PPATK works primarily with money laundering, of which corruption is its underlying crime.

Nevertheless, the creation of the the PPATK was not solely based on combating corruption. International donors, such as the IMF and the World Bank, recommended that countries create financial intelligence units to "*fight organized crime, corruption, and the financing of terrorism, and maintain financial markets' integrity*" (International Monetary Fund and The World Bank, 2004, p. 1). Historically, criminalizing money laundering is related to the fight against illicit traffic of narcotics, drugs, and psychotropic substances (United Nations Vienna Convention 1988). Other UN Conventions, the International Convention Against Transnational Organized Crimes (UN Palermo Convention 2000) and the Convention Against Corruption (UNCAC), also refer to criminalizing money laundering as a strategy to combat crimes (Husein, 2004, pp. 342–363). After the infamous terrorist attack on September 11 in the United States, the Financial Action Task Force (FATF) highlighted the critical role of the financial intelligence unit in detecting suspicious transactions related to financing terrorist groups (Pieth, 2002, pp. 131–145).

iii. Witness and Victim Protection Agency

Another institution supporting law enforcement agencies is the Witness and Victim Protection Agency (*Lembaga Perlindungan Saksi dan Korban* or LPSK), created in 2006 as part of recommendations under the TAP MPR XIII/2001. Teten Masduki, the former Coordinator of the Indonesia Corruption Watch (ICW), argued that the LPSK is integral to eradicating corruption alongside the KPK and the PPATK (Masduki, 2008). The LPSK aims to protect witnesses and victims who blow the whistle or report a crime, especially the crime of corruption. The LPSK would also give the whistleblower incentives such as legal assistance, a stipend, and lesser punishment (by the LPSK if they also committed a crime). These incentives encourage more whistleblowers to reveal the most challenging corruption crime to detect.

Indonesian CSOs, with the support of donors, contributed in many ways to creating the LPSK. First, by "*forming an Alliance for Witness Protection, and organizing multi-stakeholder discussion forums to direct and manage the drafting of a witness and victim protection law*" (Setiyono, McLeod, 2010, p. 359). Moreover, CSOs such as the ICW and the Institute for Criminal Justice Reform (ICJR) also published the blueprint for the LPSK (Eddiyono et al., 2008). This publication was supported by the Danish International Development Agency (DANIDA) and the Asia Foundation (TAF). This blueprint also mentioned the need to cooperate with CSOs in providing a "safe house" to the witness or victim (Eddiyono et al., 2008, p. 111).

The LPSK has protected a number of witnesses since its creation. Agus Condro, for instance, received protection from the LPSK because he reported bribery from the Central Bank of Indonesia (BI) to the members of Parliament to appoint Miranda S. Goeltom as a Deputy Governor of the BI. The KPK investigated this report and prosecuted 26 members of Parliament, including Agus Condro himself (Lembaga Perlindungan Saksi dan Korban, 2012). The LPSK assisted him in receiving a lesser punishment because of his role in revealing the crime. In 2018, the Head of the LPSK, Abdul Haris Semendawai, claimed that the LPSK had protected 148 witnesses and victims from corruption (Belarminus, Meiliana, 2018).

IV. Lack of resources challenge to implement Anti-Corruption policies in the Reformasi and Post-Reformasi periods

In the early period of creating this institution (2005), the Late Adnan Buyung Nasution, a founder of the Indonesian Legal Aid organization, reminded the government to fulfill its good governance by more than just creating those institutions discussed in the previous section (CR, 2005). He demanded the government's commitment to allocate an adequate budget, recruit high-quality staff, and secure these institutions' independence (CR, 2005). After several years of operation, these institutions gathered to make a Joint Statement asking the government for more budget and staff in 2009 (Mys/Ali, 2009). The government has not solved this problem since they made the statement, as I will describe in this section. Some literature and reports have emphasized adequate resources as one factor in successful anti-corruption institutions and programs (Bolongaita, 2010; Poverty Reduction and Economic Management Unit and The World Bank East Asia and Pacific Region, 2003). However, inadequate budgets and salaries are viewed as one factor that causes corruption to flourish within the Indonesian public sector (McLeod, 2008, pp. 199–223). Law enforcement agencies also face inadequate budget issues (Afrida, Pandaya, 2016).

An adequate budget allocation has been referred as one of key factors for a government to implement strategies, policies, and programs (Smith, Larimer, 2018, p. 174). However, the government has diverse policies with different goals, and it has the difficult task of allocating resources to implement such diverse polices (Peter, 2012, p. 1). One of the indicators, "continuity of effort," is used to assess whether the government has the political will to support and sustain anti-corruption efforts (Brinkerhoff, 2010). In the context of international development, Andrews et al. have called this "isomorphic mimicry," that is, "*the adoption of the forms of other functional states and organizations which camouflages a persistent lack of function*" (Andrews, Pritchett, Woolcock, 2017). When these newly adopted or created institutions were frequently asked by the government, local CSOs, IDOs, to perform too many tasks with too few resources over a short period of time, Andrews et al. argued that this "*premature load bearing*" creates pressure that could weaken the institutions' capability (Andrews, Pritchett, Woolcock, 2017).

I will describe some of the budgetary problems that hindered the implementation of Indonesian anti-corruption policies and the work of newly created anti-corruption institutions mentioned above. I will divide this lack of resources section into two subsections – prevention and repressive – according to the discussion in the previous section. This description gives readers a glimpse of background and information regarding the lack of resources in creating an institution that promotes good governance and prevents corruption in Indonesia.

In addition, the anti-corruption efforts suffered frequent setbacks in Indonesia, with the weakened KPK, the set of laws favoring oligarchs (Oil and Gas Law, and Omnibus Law), and the dual appointments for police and military personnel in civil positions (Indonesian Corruption Watch, 2015; Sambhi, 2021; Transparency International Indonesia, 2023). Under the Joko Widodo (Jokowi) administration (2014 to 2024), the main focus is developing infrastructure and deregulation to foster economic growth; however, Warburton claimed Jokowi has "*no anti-corruption agenda*" (Warburton, 2016). Baker (2023) also observed that the current administration used anti-corruption law and its law enforcement agencies to prosecute political opponents to consolidate power, and brought about "*the end of the campaign against corruption*" (Baker, 2023).

Furthermore, several scholars have noted that Indonesia's reform agenda has taken a wrong turn (Diprose, McRae, Hadiz, 2019, pp. 691–712). Lindsey (2014), for example, asserted that "*Reformasi is history*" due to the weakened Corruption Eradication Commission (KPK) and a more authoritarian government. Additionally, Baker argued that the reform movement has regressed as elites have rolled back key aspects of Indonesia's reform agenda in areas such as anti-corruption, human rights, and the rule of law (Baker, 2023). Therefore, I adopt Lindsey (2014) term "*Post-Reformasi*" to describe the anti-corruption policies during the Joko Widodo (Jokowi) administration from 2014 to 2021 (Lindsey, 2018). Most of the instances cited to describe the inadequate resources to implement anti-corruption policies occurred during the Jokowi administration. Thus, the section that discusses the problem of lack of resources also aims to add a supporting argument about the lack of political will under the Jokowi administration in supporting and sustaining anti-corruption efforts. This discussion answers lower order questions: What is the resourcing challenge created by the multilateral push for anti-corruption measures in Indonesia after 1997? (1.b.) How do we assess the current state of resourcing for Indonesian anti-corruption policies? (1.c.)

A. Lack of resources at the institutions that prevent corruption

Numerous publications have cited the lack of resources to support the work of the Information Commission, especially after the creation of regional Information Commission offices. Sjoraida, Asmawi, and Anwar (2018) found that the lack of resources was one of the challenges for the West Java Information Commission to promote freedom of information effectively. Harun (2016, pp. 1–11) also documented the same challenge with the South Kalimantan Information Commission, which received a relatively small annual budget (IDR 762 million in 2015) and administrative hurdles to use the budge. The National/Federal Information Commission also faces a budgeting challenge because the budget is planned and allocated by the Indonesian Ministry of Communication and Informatics. The inadequate resources contributed to the failure and effectiveness of the Information Commission in implementing the Freedom of Information Law (Butt, 2014, pp. 113–154).

Unlike the Information Commission, the Ombudsman is an independent institution that deals with its budget directly with the Parliament. This legal structure gives the Ombudsman more independence than the Information Commission in planning and proposing budgets. However, the Ombudsman also faces an inadequate budget to work according to its tasks and duties (Harijanti, 2013). This problem became apparent when the Ombudsman was mandated to set up regional offices in every province between 2010–2016. A coalition of CSOs evaluated the Ombudsman's 2011–2016 performance and found that the lack of budget limited its work to prevent maladministration and corruption (Masyarakat Peduli Pelayanan Publik, 2000). After the regional Ombudsman offices began to operate, Bedner also found budgetary problems where these offices "*are fully dependent on the central Ombudsman for their finances*" (Bedner, 2018, pp. 167–187). In some instances, these offices paid some of their expenses out of their own pockets (Bedner, 2018, pp. 167–187). One solution that is always advocated by policymakers, scholars, and CSOs is to increase the resources. In 2023, for example, the Parliament invited two Universitas Indonesia professors to speak at the public hearing on the bill to revise the Ombudsman law, and they also proposed staff and budget increases (Thea DA, 2023).

For the LKPP, the main problem is its human resources. In its evaluation report, the LKPP stated that it had limited staff to manage the information system for the public procurement certification (LKPP, n.d.). The The LKPP has the task of administering public procurement training and certification to improve members' quality, professionalism, integrity, and accountability (LKPP, 2024). The LKPP also experienced a lack of human resources in socializing the *Swakelola Tipe III*, the type of public procurement for the CSOs (Widoyoko, 2022). In addition to the quantity, the quality of LKPP staff is another issue. Arifin and Hartadi found that some LKPP auditors do not have a professional certificate to audit fraud in public procurement (Arifin, Hartadi, 2020, pp. 11–21).

The lack of human and financial resources remains a major challenge for the *Stranas* PK (Suyatmiko, Nicola, Fajrin, 2020 Sekretariat Nasional Pencegahan Korupsi, 2020; Wijayanti, Kasim, 2021, pp. 291–310). Transparency International Indonesia (TII) criticized the government for not allocating the budget for the *Stranas* PK National Secretary to coordinate, supervise, and run the programs (Nicola et al., 2020). *Stranas* PK budget is under the KPK and other related agencies' annual budgets, and the *Stranas* PK National Secretary staff are in a temporary job with a one-year contract. This arrangement creates uncertainty and a lack of sustainability in implementing anti-corruption prevention strategies. Therefore, TII proposed that the government allocate a designated budget and recruit more permanent staff to coordinate and run the *Stranas PK* program (Nicola et al., 2020).

B. Lack of resources at the institutions that enforce crimes of corruption

As an independent agency, the KPK still needs support from both the government and the Parliament to secure its resources (Transparency International Indonesia, 2023). The KPK faces ongoing and daily political struggles to weaken anti-corruption efforts (Umam et al, 2020, pp. 125–143). For instance, the Parliament halted the funds requested by the KPK to erect a new building in 2013; this led to a public campaign where the ICW organized public crowdfunding (*saweran*) to fund the KPK building (Fariz, 2012).

In the past four years, the KPK has also experienced the strongest resistance from the government and the Parliament. In 2019, the government and the Parliament revised the KPK. The revised KPK law sets up a supervisory committee to monitor the KPK's work. Before exercising their authority, each KPK investigator and prosecutor must receive a search, seizure, and wiretap warrant from a supervisory committee appointed by the president. At the end of 2019, the Parliament selected Firli Bahuri, a police general, as the HeadHead of the KPK. Scholars and CSOs criticized this appointment because of his poor track record. He violated an ethical rule while working as the Head of the Law Enforcement Unit at the KPK (Bramasta, Hardiyanto, 2020). Also, the KPK has a hostile relationship with the police. The KPK has investigated three police generals in three different crime of corruption cases. Every time the KPK announced a police general as a suspect, the police institution launched investigations on KPK leaders and investigators for other crimes (Jakarta Globe, 2015). In addition to these issues, in 2021 more than 70 KPK independent investigators and staff failed to pass the Civic Knowledge Test administered by the National Civil Service Agency, a government institution (Nugraha, 2021). This result made the KPK more dependent on recruiting investigators and staff from existing agencies, such as the police and prosecutor's offices.

The Anti-Corruption Court also experiences a lack of resource problems, similar to problems of other specialized courts such as the Constitutional Court, Industrial Court, and Human Rights Court (Crouch, 2021, pp. 1–25). In 2009, the Parliament passed the Anti-Corruption Court Law, which ordered the Indonesian Supreme Court or MA to establish anti-corruption courts in many other cities around Indonesia. This law mandated the Indonesian Supreme Court to establish more than 514 anti-corruption courts. However, the Supreme Court could only create anti-corruption courts in each Indonesian province because of a lack of resources. For example, an anti-corruption court in Central Java could not operate fully because the court did not have any budget allocation in 2010 and had to wait for the 2011 budget.

Moreover, some court officers did not want to work for an anti-corruption court because they had not received the additional remuneration as promised (Herdiana, 2011). The Supreme Court claimed the budgeting issue hindered the creation of regional anti-corruption courts. The 2010 Supreme Court Annual Report stated that the Supreme Court budget had been allocated to other priority programs. It was not easy to amend the budget allocation or request additional funding. Additionally, the AGO complained about establishing a provincial anti-corruption court because the prosecutor in its district office has an insufficient budget to prosecute corruption cases at the anti-corruption courts in the province's capital.

In addition, the *Sukamiskin* prison has struggled to meet the inmates' needs and maintain facilities. Some inmates bribed the prison warden and officials to upgrade the facilities in prison and their cell (Ramadhan, 2023, pp. 171–182). Yasona Laoly, the Minister of Law and Human Rights, acknowledged the lack of a government budget to provide all prisoners with hygienic and clean sitting toilet (Najwa Shihab, 2018). The Minister then admitted that inmates with more money could afford to improve facilities in their cells. Sudaryono (2018) commented that this situation is "*...like putting a grizzly bear in a wobbly bamboo cage designed to hold goats guarded by unskilled shepherds*." He argued that the underfunded and understaffed *Sukamiskin* prison contributed to the prison corruption. He proposed reforms; two of three required additional budget allocation: improving prison staff resiliency through rewards and training and installing electronic devices such as CCTV and electronic ankle bracelets (Sudaryono, 2018).

The KY also experienced problems with the scarcity of financial resources. In 2010, the Head of the KY complained that its budget was less than other newly created institutions such as the KPK and the PPATK (Muqoddas, 2010, p. 60). To cover its financial needs, the KY received support from international donors. Donors' support comes in various programs and outputs. In 2010, the National Legal Reform Program (NLRP), funded by the Dutch government, supported the KY in publishing its blueprint (Komisi Yudisial Republik Indonesia, 2010). One of the the KY's leaders has also complained about the limited number of investigators to find evidence of judges' misconduct (Koran Tempo, 2013). Recently, the KY also experienced a budget cut due to the COVID-19 pandemic in Indonesia (Purnamasari, 2021).

The Prosecutorial and Police Commissions have also faced insufficient resources (Khairi, 2022, pp. 1–7). The budgets of both commissions report to the Coordinating Minister of Politic, Law, and Defense. Thus, these budgets were reduced when this Ministry cut its budget (Mustami, 2017). In 2019, the Prosecutor Commission complained about the lack of funding that was not sufficient to do its work. The Commission stated this complaint in its 2019 Annual Report (Komisi Kejaksaan Republik Indonesia, 2020). The Prosecutor Commission also published a policy proposal to increase its nine commissioners' salaries and other benefits in 2021 (Komisi Kejaksaan Republik Indonesia, 2021). Moreover, some scholars highlighted the inadequate number of staff to handle public complaints about the prosecutor (Suyanto, Andriyanto, Nugroho, 2020, pp. 52–60). To address this issue, Rachman proposed the creation of a Prosecutor Commission in every province and city in Indonesia, a proposal that would cost Indonesian taxpayers (Rachman, 2016).

The Police Commission also does not have sufficient human resources to handle public complaints about the police (Nasrullah, 2023, pp. 3581–3592) and it still uses the National Police Assets; therefore, this arrangement undermines the Commission's independence and impartiality in handling public complaints on police misconduct (Pandupraja, 2005, p. 39). The Police Commission published a policy paper admitting that "*...the Police Commission in its performance has become unprofessional because it does not have adequate facilities and infrastructure*" (Komisi Kepolisian Republik Indonesia, 2013). In 2005, Umar warned that creating the Police Commission without sufficient resources and independence would waste the government's (and therefore the taxpayers') money (Umar, 2005, p. 83).

IV. Conclusion

This paper described the features of the Indonesian anti-corruption policies during the *Reformasi* and post-*Reformasi* period. This description included the IDOs' or donors' involvement as part of a law and development project in supporting the creation of several institutions to prevent and enforce crimes of corruption (Juwono, 2016; 2014; Setiyono, McLeod, 2010, pp. 347–370; 2010), These institutions are the Anti-Corruption Agency (KPK), Anti-Corruption Court, Judicial Commission (KY), Ombudsman, and many others. Of note is that the Indonesian citizens bear all the operational costs after the CSOs and IDOs stop supporting this institution. This paper also discussed the challenges, mainly the lack of resources, including infrastructure, human, and financial resources, to implement these policies based on secondary sources or previous publications regarding the Indonesian anti-corruption policies (Harijanti, 2013; Harun, 2016; Ramadhan, 2022; Suyatmiko, Nicola, Fajrin, 2020). This discussion elaborates on one of the challenges in implementing and maintaining development projects using the Indonesian anti-corruption projects as a case study. Most of these anti-corruption institutions and programs faced the lack of resources problem. Scholars and donors have highlighted the limited resources as one of the problems that hamper the Indonesian government in achieving these goals. These resourcing challenges suggest a lack of sustained political will to sustain the anti-corruption efforts, which was initially supported by the multilateral push, and insufficiency of revenue from the collection of monetary sanctions due to legal loopholes. These insights provide further support for moderate or "good enough governance" reforms that are not too big, much, and fast, by paying more attention to the recipient's country political will, capacity, and resources (Grindle, 2004; 2007). This paper set the background and rationales for conducting a benefit-cost analysis of the Indonesian anti-corruption policies.

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