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A FEW REMARKS ON THE CONDITIONS FOR PEACE: REFLECTIONS ON HUMANITY

Abstract

The article deals with contemporary conditions for peace. Conceptualising the ethics standing behind peace, the author points to an urgent need to introduce peaceful relations within societies and between states, particularly in the urban era. As a point of reference serve the works of Tiziano Terzani, postulating a thorough reconsideration of the values guiding international policies and a genuine renouncement of war. In the final part of the article the unique role of universities, perceived by the author as the only subject capable of shaping new ethical dialogue is discussed. A wide humanistic education of individuals seems to be an indispensable condition for a lasting peace.

Keywords: peace, pacifism, Tiziano Terzani, education for peace, universities, globalisation, postliberalism

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Introduction: the need to apprehend

Between the two World Wars, in 1932 Albert Einstein addressed Sigmund Freud with the question: “Tell me what drives man to war?” And he continued to explore the possibilities of directing the evolution of the human psyche so that human beings “become more resistant to the psychosis of hatred and destruction.” In response, Freud highlighted two factors which, in his opinion, would have an impact on the termination of wars in the near future, namely “a civilized attitude and a justified fear of the effects of a future war”.¹ Freud did not witness World War II, but its crimes led Einstein to acknowledge the point of calling for pacifism. In his last appeal to people for survival in 1955, he urged: “Above all, remember your humanity, forget everything else.” The scholar attempted to reach the core, i.e. the necessity to make everyone aware of humanity as a special value of human survival. One can notice here a command to constantly be guided by the thought of humanity as a criterion for assessing the actions of people and their organisation. This view corresponds with the practically treated principle of helping a fellow human being. The aforementioned answer by Freud initiated an optimistic thought that a culturally developed man, more intelligent and aware of the dangers, would halt the war. The Second World War and its aftermaths led to mistrust towards simple, logically and humanistically convincing answers relying on the development of civilisation and its assurance of peace. A reality full of global conflicts is constantly negatively verifying both Freud’s diagnosis and Einstein’s appeal. It has even had to face an issue of the human race survival.²

After the events of September 11, 2001, writer Tiziano Terzani wondered what drives people to blow themselves up, commit suicides, “burn in the fire of new spreading violence against which the Twin Towers hecatomb may turn out to be just an episode”. The writer argued that he did not mean justification or forgiveness of but rather understanding of terrorism. The source of this pursuit of understanding lay in his conviction that the drama of terrorism could not be solved simply by removing terrorists but rather the reasons which fuel their attitude. The consequence of September 11 (9/11), embodied by the American intervention in Afghanistan, made the writer even more eager to gain the aforementioned understanding of

¹ T. Terzani, *Listy przeciwko wojnie*, trans. J. Wachowiak-Finlaison, Wydawnictwo WAB, Warszawa 2012, pp. 47–48. More on pacifism see M. Szyszkowska, *Etyka*, Kresowa Agencja Wydawnicza, Białystok 2010, pp. 137–144. Regarding far war cf. K. Kuźmich, *Pokój z punktu widzenia filozoficznoprawnego*, [in:] *Pokój i demokracja*, M. Szyszkowska (Ed.), tCHu, doM wYdawniczy, Warszawa 2009, p. 372; J. Oniszczyk, *Filozofia i teoria prawa*, 2nd edition, C.H. Beck, Warszawa 2012, pp. 135–137, 165.

² M. Szyszkowska, *Odcienie codzienności*, Kresowa Agencja Wydawnicza, Białystok 2009, p. 181.

the consequences of the Afghan war, which back then, in the years 2001–2002, the Americans referred to as ‘only the first phase’. In this situation, based on a kind of analogy, the writer said that he wanted to “understand what will happen to the rest of the world – our world, the world of everyone – when this war probably moves from here to Iraq, Somalia, Sudan, maybe to Syria, Lebanon and who knows where else”. The writer also noted that Washington had predicted the terrorists hideouts in about 60 countries and believed that those who would not cooperate with the US would be considered an enemy. Against the backdrop of these findings, Terzani was surprised that Europe reacted very reticently “against this almost suicidal tenacity of America” and proceeded to ask “Is it possible that Europe has become yet another great victim of this war?”³ In this setting, Terzani adopted September 10 as a unique reference point for terrorism, with its particularity being that it was the day “before the new barbarism, before the restriction of our freedom, before intolerance, technological war, massacres of prisoners and innocent civilians, before great hypocrisy, conformism, indifference or, worse, petty anger and misunderstood pride. The day after which our dreams of growing mutual love, brotherhood, greater spirituality and greater joy turned into more hatred, discrimination, materialism, more pain”. After September 11, the writer found it hard to notice that the then America was awakened to “think everything over: relations between countries, between religions, with nature, between men” and made an examination of its conscience⁴ and remained uninspired. Terzani described it as “arrogant, blunt, focused exclusively on itself, triumphing in its power, in its wealth, without any understanding or curiosity about the rest of the world”. While travelling across America he was struck by “the ubiquitous sense of superiority, the conviction of its own uniqueness and strength, of being an ideal civilization. Everything without any self-irony”. Another reflection that followed was looking at “Americans as victims of some brainwashing: everyone says the same thing, they think the same”. Comparing them with the Koreans, he concluded that the only difference was that Americans thought that “they do it of their own free will and do not realize that their conformism is the fruit of everything they see, drink, hear and eat”. But the writer also noted that some 9/11 perpetrators, perceived as enemies, were denied ‘humanity’ (e.g. by Oriana Fallaci). In general, such a denial of humanity is perceived by the writer as the source of ‘bestiality of all wars’. Discussing the problem of terrorism, Terzani did not really deal with the point of war on terrorists but took on a wiser approach to focus on the reasons why people were driven towards jihad and the views that killing others or committing

³ T. Terzani, *op.cit.*, pp. 40, 78.

⁴ *Ibid.*, pp. 8, 9.

a suicide was their life mission. So, he argued, genuine faith in the inviolability of life means having to accept the inviolability of all people's lives. In another case, a situation emerges of allowing "hundreds or thousands to be killed – including civilians and unarmed – who will be victims of our retaliation"⁵

The importance of 9/11 and the subsequent preservation of American opinion as well as the course of hostilities in Afghanistan, provided the writer with a justification for presenting this war as a certain symbol – a specific litmus test of American "civilization momentum, lack of morality or the ability to understand that violence breeds only violence and that only by force of peace, not by force of arms, can we solve the problems we face".⁶

The terrorist-war experience from 2001 to the Paris events of November 2015 could be described as a time far from good in terms of global peace. However, since the Paris attacks, peace has arguably taken the shape of bad peace more clearly. Since 9/11, thinking about peace as a premise for globalisation⁷ has been accompanied by the idea that globalisation is associated not only with good but also with evil occurrences, with global terrorism reflecting yet failing to explain some areas of evil. In the times of terror, on the other hand, similarly to the times of war, the truth is the first to die. Entire power is taken over by lies that justify all the atrocities and wickedness of war. It also shapes the absurdity of the 'shame of condemnation' of war as such, but also empowers the vices of democracy by avoiding reflections about war. Thus, a question arises about the role of people striving to reflect on the world of violence. The question remains whether war can really suspend the sense of culture.

In an attempt to answer this question, a Palestinian American, Professor Edward Said points to the responsibility of intellectuals, whose response to the lies of war should include seeking the truth and "creating fields of understanding, not battlefields". So it is from the world of intellectuals that reflection and questions are expected, even though the so-called common public opinion has recognised the obviousness and necessity of the Afghan war as a just fight of the democratic world against terrorism. Terzani reminds us that "in times of war, talking about peace cannot be a crime," as raising issues is an essential function of reflection and doubt itself is the foundation of European culture. Therefore, the writer compared the attempt to remove 'doubts from our minds' to 'the desire to deprive our lungs of oxygen'.⁸

Among the crucial issues concerning deliberations on matters of peace are the conditions that serve it as well as those that undermine it and, as such, are best

⁵ Ibid, pp. 14–16, 28–29.

⁶ Ibid, p. 70.

⁷ K. Kuźmicz, *op.cit.*, p. 373.

⁸ T. Terzani, *op.cit.*, pp. 76–77, 44–45.

to be prevented or resolved. This, in turn, requires constant freedom of thought. The problem of contemporary complexity of thinking about peace in the globally dominant American democracy featured in the speech by President Barack Obama at the 2009 Nobel Peace Prize. He said that in the modern world democratic countries could not give up violence for the sake of their defence. He also stated that the use of military force was to be justified in the event of necessary defence and that the conduct of an armed conflict was to be carried out according to 'civilized principles'. When it comes to striving for peace (achieving 'lasting peace'), three things matter: 1) developing effective methods for the international community to deal with countries and communities that 'break the rules and laws', such as international sanctions; 2) determining 'the nature of peace we are seeking' because peace does not entail a state of absence of clear conflict characteristics; lasting peace is only possible if it is based on universal observance of the dignity and rights of the individual, which means that there is a lack of acceptance for the assumption that cultural differences may allow different concepts of human rights in individual countries; 3) creating conditions that give people a sense of economic security and development opportunities, because "Without hope, society is rotting from the inside".⁹ This view is characterised by rejecting a purely pacific position, assuming that peace will be achieved through gestures and courtesy. At the same time, it can be an excuse for the stance that armed conflict is a mechanism for bringing peace. The President's approach was also qualified as part of the tradition of the American vision that US foreign policy is involved in the dispute between good and evil, where the power of the US is on the side of good. Interpretations by the President himself limit the 'messianism' of the USA: although he perceives the USA as the strongest state in the world and American visions of freedom and democracy as universal, this state cannot solve the problems of a world whose countries developed in various cultures.¹⁰ Noteworthy in this context are observations made by the French journalist and philosopher Guy Sorman on the eve of the American elections. He believed that the conservative revolution of the 1980s in the USA was still ongoing. According to him, "the American heart remains reactionary-conservative. A democratic president will be less conservative than a republican, but he will remain inside the square drawn by Ronald Reagan in 1980: limited state interference, morality, the market and military activism".¹¹

⁹ Following P. Gillert, *Pokój według Obamy*, "Rzeczpospolita" 11.12.2009, p. A10.

¹⁰ M. Bosacki, *Obama mówił jak posłodzony Bush*, "Gazeta Wyborcza" 12–13.12.2009, p. 11.

¹¹ G. Sorman, *Wybory 2008 nie zmieniają Ameryki*, "Europa", supplement to "Dziennik" 29.12.2007, p. 7.

1. Philosophical references to peace

The reflection on peace has pre-philosophical roots. Along the mentions which appeared in the works by Homer, it prominently featured in the poetry by Hesiod (*Theogony*), who mentioned that Zeus married 'blooming Eirene' (Peace). Also, one of Aristophanes' comedies is called Eirene. Hesiod's interpretation acknowledged the connection between divine order and human order by means of norms introducing "good social order, justice and peace".¹² Reflecting on the social order, Hesiod also pictured a city of justice and a city of hubris. He saw the foundation of human order in social justice, of which gods were to be guarantors.¹³ The ancients also realised the significance of peace of wisdom, which, according to Xenophanes, among others, serves the rule of *polis* and well-being of people. Euripides, who elaborated this thought, argued that a *polis* needs wise, virtuous, prudent, and just citizens, not the ones who "brought up on myths, succumbing to their pernicious influence, incite civil wars".¹⁴

Therefore, it was especially in wisdom that the conditions for righteous policies and proper human behaviour were found. But the fundamental question remains: How to make a citizen wise, not to mention virtuous, prudent or just? And nowadays, an additional question arises: How to solve the unsolvable, how to get out of the maze from which the exit was not foreseen? This arguably horrendous situation seems to be taking place in this era of the implementation of the global postliberal scenario, under the rule of some Neo-Hobbesian soul, guided by the principle of universal distrust and competition, rooted in unimaginable economic, financial, and social imbalances and injustices, and finally, egoistic exploitation of nature through postliberal capitalism. Wisdom-peace thinking does not stem from any radical project, such as the destruction of 'power hub' of the ruling ideologies, nor is it devoid of knowledge of human right (freedom) to resistance adequate to oppression.

The recognition of the pro-development and humanist meaning of peace has solid justification. Back in antiquity it was discovered that peace was a condition for development and that no war ends the chain of its nightmares. The well-known principle that a certain event, which first is a tragedy when repeated takes the form of a grotesque and subsequently vanishes, does not apply to war, as each military conflict is a tragedy, only on a different scale. Thousands of ancient descriptions of wars and the justifications for peace resulting therefrom were compounded by the

¹² O. Murray, *Narodziny Grecji*, Prószyński i S-ka, Warszawa 2004, p. 87.

¹³ Ibid, pp. 248–249.

¹⁴ J. Gajda, *Prawo natury i umowa społeczna w filozofii przedsokratejskiej*, Wydawnictwo Uniwersytetu Wrocławskiego, Wrocław 1986, pp. 108–109.

drama of World War I and II. These conflicts involved gigantic numbers of fatalities (60 million) and an unimaginable destruction of economies as well as material and cultural heritage, especially in Europe. After those tragedies, for the so-called ordinary man, any peace may be better than the most legitimate war. Peace is an unimaginable good. But what does 'any peace' mean, i.e., does it have its own quality and does such peace ultimately suffice for human well-being if its perspective is hopelessness and oppression? Is peace enough when it fails to include the minimum for a liveable life and is full of danger? Ensuring such peace is not a proper exercise of power, hence the question appeared a long time ago of liberating man from 'oppressive' peace and its freedom of resistance. Therefore, not every kind of peace creates conditions for human well-being, particularly not a 'peace' full of violence and various types of discrimination against people.

An enormous amount of bad experience has been gathered from global governance of postliberal ideology. It seems responsible for generating unimaginable income gaps and all inequalities, exclusion, discrimination and the universality of conflict-thinking through the implementation of education for competition and the resulting practices of people, societies, and countries. The global scale of oppression of postliberalism means that fewer and fewer people recognise the possibility of a positive, organisational role of postliberalism in the world (often mistakenly called as neoliberalism). In this situation, a fundamental issue is which philosophical vision, or what concept will guide further globalisation? What should peace look like in order to enable human well-being and a beneficial globalisation, instead of a harmful one? A wise and simultaneously realistic answer to this issue seems almost unconceivable, simply because since antiquity the attempts to solve human problems by means of war conflicts have always been based on positive slogans of defence or the fight for justice, freedom, liberation or democracy. Numerous wars referred to religions, entangling the names of gods, and were conducted in the name of justice or the only true, universally binding idea. Currently, a lack of such a common idea organising people, e.g. living in an egalitarian society (e.g. by the writer Orhan Pamuk) is often emphasised. The only question is whether, against the backdrop of various 'ambitious' ideologies, such a traditionally conceived universal idea is necessary. It can be recalled that in relation to some Hobbesian vision of the world, Kant had already tried to present the Enlightenment resolution. He warned against war and suggested a peaceful exit from the wrong path. In the premise of his project about the sense of eternal peace, the thought arose that this was a necessary task for reason. This approach continues the ancient understanding of peace related to human wisdom. And, what is more, following this path of *a contrario* thinking, it can be said that non-peace thinking is characterised by non-wise human approaches or attitudes.

These approaches disregard the truth that dies first in the times of war. Regarding the war in Afghanistan, Terzani argues that it is a big lie, while “Those who really matter in this war of lies are spin doctors, communication experts, public relations employees. They are the ones who pull the smokescreen on the senselessness of this war and do not allow global public opinion [...] to adopt a different, moral perspective of these events”. The thinker noticed that this war “seems so vague that it must be constantly wrapped up or managed, subjected to a clever advertising campaign. But that is how our world has become: advertising has taken the place of literature whereas slogans move us more than poetry. The only way not to give it up is to insist on independent thinking and, above all, your own conscience”. Emotions play a great role in this war of lies because these false pieces of information were supposed to justify the atrocities of the war and “make victims become part of the” inevitable price “that must be paid to free the world from the danger of terrorism”. The writer assessed American oriented information and disinformation policy as fuelling the “anger of public opinion in the Western world”¹⁵ and conducive to subjecting war opponents to ‘court verdicts’ and censorship of their writings.¹⁶

The aforementioned wisdom (rational) qualification of Kant’s pro-peace deliberations is based on the principle of humanity, which also appears in Einstein’s reasoning. The Kantian principle recognises humanity as an end in itself and indicates that it is only in peace conditions that it can be achieved. Considering the universal necessity of this principle, there appears the issue of its fulfilment in both internal and international relations. It is the duty of people and states to pursue the goal of eternal peace, with wars, even the so-called ‘fair’ ones, considered unacceptable, due to their immoral treatment of man, whose instrumental treatment appears as a means to an end.

The second section of Kant’s *Perpetual Peace* begins with the observation that a state of peace, in contrast to a state of war, is not a default setting (“A state of peace among men who live side by side is not the natural state (*status naturalis*), which is rather to be described as a state of war, that is to say, although there is not perhaps always actual open hostility, yet there is a constant threatening that an outbreak may occur”). Observing the hostile inclinations of people – visible especially among nations – as well as conflicting ways of asserting their rights, the philosopher recognises that a peace treaty may end the war but will put no end to the martial law. However, if reason, “from the height of its highest”, legislative power, unconditionally condemns

¹⁵ T. Terzani, *op.cit.*, pp. 76–77, 111.

¹⁶ E. Zarzycka-Bérard, J.-Y. Potel, *Maspero, przyjaciel wolności*, “Gazeta Wyborcza” 14–15.11.2015, pp. 33–34.

war as a legal procedure (while making a state of peace the immediate duty, secured in an agreement between nations), a special relationship (a peaceful relationship) will come up and end a state of war between people¹⁷. The abandonment of hostilities, as mentioned, is not yet a guarantee of a permanent peace.

In reference to Kant's visions, a project emerges: peace as a condition for the formation of a society of peoples. In the 1990s its author, John Rawls, formulated the idea that a reasonably just society of the peoples of the world is possible in the face of such concepts as 'reasonable pluralism', 'democratic unity in diversity', 'democratic peace' or 'public reason'. His concept emerged in the time of a transition from traditional rural culture to urban culture¹⁸. A contemporary justification for peace also begins to emerge from urban justification, following the recent increase in the number of people living in cities over the number of inhabitants of the countryside. The pragmatic urban vision of the world recognises that the condition for the functioning of expanding giant cities remaining in global relationships is the need for continuous cooperation and interdependence of people. Without it, and, thus, without peace, the city will not live. Therefore, it makes more sense to talk about the right of the earthly community to peace in the context of growing urban clusters, where the interdependence of people has increased enormously.

2. Good and bad peace: postliberalism as an ideological source of global evil

The above remarks refer to the concepts of good and bad peace. The question is what kind of desirable peace will be able to promote a beneficial globalisation? What conditions should it meet? One may probably agree that peace as a condition for a beneficial globalisation and human well-being is an evolutionary path that goes from accepting a tolerable peace to good peace. It is these favourable conditions that may be put forward by standardisations of human rights and procedures enabling freedom of an individual, a good case in point being the inclusion of the principles of non-discrimination in the law.

Historical experience, initiated in ancient Greece by Herodotus, proves that the foundation of any peace is justice and non-discrimination. Creation of material inequalities and unequal treatment of people spark bitterness from slight irritation, through expectations of compensating the injustice, to great frustration and radicalism,

¹⁷ I. Kant, *On the Old Saw: That May be Right in Theory But It Won't Work in Practice*, 1793.

¹⁸ J. Rawls, *The Law of Peoples*, Harvard University Press, Cambridge-London 1999.

accompanied by 'taking matters' into one's own hands, which entails active resistance. The latter condition usually appears in a situation of repression against those calling for justice.¹⁹ And yet both Homer and Hesiod warned against injustice: the former in the world of politics and struggle, and the latter – in the world of work. They found that exceeding norms and injustice inevitably leads to punishment, and this includes not only the perpetrators of *hubris*, but also their loved ones, and even the whole society.

It is hard not to notice that various concepts justifying the sense of peace and condemning wars do not impress those who conduct business on arms production and conflicts. Greed as a source of any evil²⁰ seeks for circumstances where various untruths enjoy freedom and recognition. Under conflict, justice and law fall silent in favour of lies. It is not difficult to imagine the success of greed also in terms of appropriating peace; for example, when it proposes a competition in who will better express and justify peace. The award in such a competition for the best wisdom idea for peace would be another absurdity proposed by the civilisation of postliberal consumption. Postliberal care for good peace for every individual seems, to put it mildly, ironic.

It seems justified to observe that a significant, although invisible evil has emerged; it does not hurt directly, but similarly to nuclear radiation brings a total destruction. This is the ideological basis of the postliberalism, totalitarian in its character. As such, it may be defined as responsible for the detrimental operation of global markets, for the global nature of unrest and fear. Instead creating global trust and cooperation, postliberalism creates huge social imbalances and inequalities. In impoverished societies, small differences take on tremendous importance, as a result of which tolerance towards novelty or other people is disappearing, even among the intellectual elite. Postliberal ideology has proposed values that have not worked out over time, particularly like the idea that success is possible thanks to one's own hard efforts. Ultimately, it has generated, even in Europe, a significant sense of social disintegration and questioning of the validity of the elites by many social spheres.²¹ In a world deregulated by postliberalism, financial institutions have failed as a market regulator of risk assessment, since able as they were to generate benefits, they charged taxpayers with losses. One can see that inequalities and imbalances from the earlier era have been added onto inequalities and imbalances generated by financial neocapitalism. There is no major dispute that a certain level of inequality can be conducive

¹⁹ J. Oniszczyk, *Budowanie nowoczesnej polis*, op.cit., pp. 367–399.

²⁰ J. Oniszczyk, *Budowanie nowoczesnej polis*, op. cit., p. 468 and ff.

²¹ A. Leszczyński, *Młoda Polska prawicowa*, "Gazeta Wyborcza" 14–15.11.2015, p. 17.

to progress, especially when real promotion paths are created, when everyone has a real chance of improving their situation. However, when financial capitalism has been conducting a massive exclusion, along with the deepening of disparities and the development of frustration accompanied by various manifestations of people's degeneration and anger, the first stage protecting from the disaster could be mastering the anarchy of financial markets. This should be accompanied by a change of financial neocapitalism into real production and service, a change in postliberal thinking to rebuild liberal thinking.

The world of bad peace has existed many times and its causes have been described, which does not mean that these descriptions have brought on its elimination or invalidation. Therefore, a crucial issue of what characterises bad peace and what serves good peace remains. Probably the oppression of the authorities can be mentioned here, as well as their approval of violence of populism, including the populism of politicians fearfully looking at popularity bars and feeding on social fears. And opposite qualities include social violence, fanaticism and superstition, simplifications, adulteration, ignorance, empty beliefs, aversion to minorities, antisemitism, a lack of respect for others, nationalism, intolerance²² or imposing a way of life. An example of living in conditions of bad peace is the state "in which freedom of speech is limited and sometimes no one has the courage to speak. [...]. We have no freedom of speech, people are unhappy, but they don't talk about it. [...] In a society that is constantly being repressed, the whole truth is never told"²³ Opposing peace is also passivity towards and irrationality, chauvinism, introducing nationalism into public debate, avoiding programme debate, followed by "primitive nationalism and religious fanaticism [...], using the naivety [...] of lost people" as well as the inability of political powers to maintain dialogue, political support for divisions, "industry of contempt" and "cynical conquering of rude and vulgar moods, which results in a wave of right-wing hate on the Internet pouring out of forums on major portals like a broken cesspool, so much so that no one can see the sense of joining a stinking discussion, due to which this participation in the so-called civic debate is like bathing in a cloak"²⁴ The destruction of public dialogue takes on other forms as well, such as a debate aimed at earn money. This is to be achieved by "effective clashing of extreme theses, which changed political discussions into jelly wrestling – to the

²² E.g. according to Bożena Keff "Being a Jew in Poland often damages one mentally, because the Catholic and nationalist idiom of Polish culture is strongly antisemitic [...]. In Poland, it is difficult to belong to a minority, no matter what, because our disease is disrespect for others". P. Pacewicz, "Jak być Żydem w Polsce", *Gazeta Wyborcza* 14–15.11.2015, p. 32.

²³ O. Pamuk in the interview: *Turcy, którzy nie lubią kobiet*, "Gazeta Wyborcza" 14–15.11.2015, pp. 18–19.

²⁴ Z. Szczerek, *Oskarżam*, "Gazeta Wyborcza" 31.10–1.11.2015, p. 15.

delight of the crowds and increased audience share”²⁵. The lack of political debate is seen as a threat to peace, because the point of opposition lies in its dispute over the best solution to the problem. Especially in a situation of fierce political and ideological struggle, the cooperation of political forces disappears.²⁶ It is against peace, for example, to recognize religious freedom as demanding that people “tolerate even appalling and outrageous religious practices”. This position of the freedom of conscience and religion “is interpreted as recognizing its priority over other freedoms and law”. It goes beyond the tradition that “no universal rights or freedoms are in principle above the other”. Only “in the event of their collision in a particular situation” does “balancing regarding which one should be given priority” take place.²⁷

Nowadays, a world of postliberal power has not only created a world of bad peace but has also begun to fight for its longest possible survival at the price of further deterioration of peace and armed conflicts, assuming that times of conflict see gathering of everyone, even the dissatisfied, under the current mechanism of power. Even in the most developed countries there are socio-economic crises; resentments are growing towards economic immigrants as well as refugees fleeing from the war. The sources of social and cultural divisions become evident, and the principles and practice of solidarity in Europe are undermined. Thus, the ethos of solidarity between different nations and cultures seems to “require defence like never before, and people who may suffer most from divisions and radicalism should support each other. There is no freedom without solidarity”²⁸.

Bad peace particularly exposes the lie about everyone’s conviction regarding their own originality. René Girard made a reference to man in the view of Aristotle whose characteristic trait is imitation. “Good mimesis is manifested in upbringing, cultivating virtues, perfecting character, imitating saints and cultural heroes. But there is also evil mimesis, enlivened by jealousy and competition for the object of desire that cannot be shared”. And an item that cannot be divided “is associated with domination: here there can be only one winner. Words like a discoverer, a king, a leader or a player are singular”. Girard noticed that mimetic competition: “man’s overwhelming tendency to confront relatives and neighbours” sometimes becomes so absorbing that those immersed in it forget about the desired object. Gradually, they sterilise social life, turning it into a Hobbesian “war of all against all”. Everyone desires what the neighbour possesses, and even more, he or she wants to humiliate them. When symbolic ranks enabling a collision-free operation disappear, power

²⁵ Ibid, p. 14.

²⁶ M. Król, *Tylko bez negocji proszę*, “Gazeta Wyborcza” 31.10–1.11.2015, p. 17.

²⁷ E. Łętowska in the interview: *No i mamy pasztyt!*, “Gazeta Wyborcza” 31.10–1.11.2015, p. 16.

²⁸ G. Rae, *Obrona solidarności*, “Dziennik Gazeta Prawna” 24–26.07.2015, p. A 23.

equals violence, and knowledge and experience lose their importance. Reciprocity, which characterizes the functioning of the group, suddenly turns into “reciprocity of insults, punches and acts of revenge as well as neurotic symptoms”. Mutual respect coupled with respect for borders evaporate. Additionally, the appearances of democracy fade: egalitarianism turns into duality-making, equality before the law – into enforced conformity. When everyone is guilty, nobody is responsible for anything. When everyone has their own truth, society cannot rely on it. The way out of this state of ‘diversity’ is to find a victim for collective violence. Groups such as Jews, sexual minorities, people with disabilities, foreigners, emigrants, people with some extremes or uniqueness, such as wealth, beauty, helplessness or some extraordinary skill e.g. intellectual, are to be susceptible to such sacrificial selection. In view of the above, one should “reject the mimicry of reciprocity, retaliation” (Girard) and “recognize their own mimicry and the tendency to be a persecutor. Only due to similar recognition and self-limitation in relations between people does order excluded from the law of violence appear”.²⁹

World peace is badly affected by the pursuit of individual societies for happiness at the expense of other people. Tiziano Terzani notices that Americans have a mission that we can call ‘the pursuit of happiness’. And while he approves this notion, he also adds that “we could first stop treating it only in the material aspect and recognise that we – Westerners – cannot chase our happiness at the expense of the happiness of others, which similarly to freedom or happiness is also indivisible”. After September 11 and after the invasion of Afghanistan, the writer asked: “Do millions of people really need to become refugees or do women and children have to die for the sake of saving our lifestyles?” In his opinion, neither American nor European public opinion was shaken by the victims, restrictions on fundamental rights or the profound injustice of war. As for this indifference to the fate of Afghans, the writer argued that it was rooted in the times of “unrestrained materialism” that “marginalized the role of morality in life, making values such as money, success, and personal benefit the exclusive evaluation criteria”. Having no time to stop and reflect, increasingly lost in lifestyles in which competition leaves less and less space for privacy, a man of prosperity and consumerism has lost the ability to compassion and indignation. He is focused on himself, with no eyes or heart for what is happening around him. The writer admitted that he was terrified of this kind of a Western man: cynical and insensitive; egoistic and politically correct regardless of the content of politics; created by “our society of development and wealth”, as much as he is of “a man with a Kalashnikov looking like a villain [...]”. These two balance each other as they are

²⁹ J. Tokarska-Bakir, *Chciał oduczyć nas przemocy*, “Gazeta Wyborcza” 14–15.11.2015, p. 34.

examples of the same phenomenon: a man who forgets that he has a conscience, who does not clearly see his role in the universe and becomes the most destructive of living creatures, by polluting water on Earth, cutting its forests, and killing its animals as well as using more and more sophisticated forms of violence against each other. In Afghanistan I saw it all clearly. It hurts me and makes me angry”.³⁰ And it is then that Terzani presents yet another aspect: another justification for the threat to peace. From the conversations with Muslims, the writer assumed “an unchanging ascertainment about being a victim of some form of violence”. The source of this feeling was supposed to come from a confrontation with the West and its vision of globalisation. The writer claims that many Muslims see globalisation as an instrument of Western “atheistic and materialistic civilisation, which is becoming richer and stronger due to the expansion of the market at the expense of [...] the world”. In this situation, religion appeared as an ideological weapon “against modernity, perceived as imposing Western culture”. According to the writer, Americans seeking the enemy found it in Islam, and the 9/11 massacre made “this enemy very credible”. Thus, it became possible to “proclaim a policy that would otherwise be unacceptable. The enemy has been identified as ‘terrorists’ and the process of demonisation of those whom Washington considers as such has begun”. Terzani did not see that the problem of terrorism could be solved militarily or by overthrowing ‘wrong’ governments, because, as he argues, “this may seem strange to us, but today there are more and more people in the world who are not striving to be like us, who don’t share our dreams”.³¹

The above discussion has partly signalled the issue of the subjective scope of terrorism. Its western univocality does not coincide with other characterisation attempts. Probably a common feature of various terrorists is bringing threats to people. Those who launched various social crises, such as the great financial and economic crisis with its unpredictable consequences, may be included into the same group as those who did not comply with health and safety regulations in the world. This assumption places various groups of industrialists and financiers into the category of terrorists. In Terzani’s opinion, “We must acknowledge that others may define a terrorist as a businessman coming to a Third World country with a bag filled not with bombs but with plans to build a chemical plant which due to the risk of explosion and environmental pollution could never be erected in a rich country of the First World”. The writer claimed that statement does not mean relativism, but is an expression of the position that “terrorism, as a way of using violence, may manifest itself in various forms, including economic ones, and that it will be difficult to arrive at common definition

³⁰ T. Terzani, *op.cit.*, pp. 30, 69. 112–113.

³¹ *Ibid.*, pp. 84, 85, 91.

of the enemy”.³² However, what differs the economic terrorists from others is the fact that they are under protection and privileges; no chief executive of a corporation deteriorating environment or bringing harm to large numbers of people stands trials.

In the comments to date, it has been pointed out that bad peace is not an internal issue. What remains important is also the quality of peace in the context of the sovereignty of states. The international practice of equality and sovereignty of states too easily accepts the fact that large states recognise exclusively the sovereignty of large states, addressing the problems of small countries’ sovereignty inadequately. They think of them in terms of their strategy. In the modern world of geostrategy, powers are said not so much to conquer new territories as to subordinate their interests to their own. In this situation, the right to self-determination is seen as a myth. When something threatens the interests of superpowers, e.g. Russia or the USA, it leads to a military intervention, which is carried out under the slogan of ‘restoring democracy’.³³

3. Conditions for good peace: the need for ethical dialogue

Speaking of a good peace opens the question of its conditions. The following points may be highlighted: dialogue, non-discrimination, no unfair inequality, low level of social frustration, a lack of oppression of power and populism, non-existence of the language of violence or hatred, no humiliation of the weaker by non-state institutions and organisations, and tolerance. With reference to the last characteristic, Terzani’s doubts if people brought up on intolerant simplifications would become better tomorrow. But the writer also recalled the statement by Arnold Toynbee: “The works of artists and writers live longer than the deeds of soldiers, politicians or merchants. Poets and philosophers are more important than historians. And saints and prophets are worth a lot more than everyone else combined. Where are the saints and prophets today? Really, you could use one! We need a new Saint Francis”.³⁴ Therefore, what seems particularly significant for good peace, is firm opposition to the unethical man, whom Jan Hartman describes, following Barbara Skarga, as “envious, malicious, cruel, constantly playing dirty tricks, lying, cheating, betraying. And he often beats, torments and kills. Out of passion, he is ready for anything. Fear and hunger deprive him of all constraints. Every day, he enjoys other people’s misfortunes while

³² Ibid, p. 50.

³³ A. Krickovic in the interview, *Niedźwiedziowi wolno więcej*, “Gazeta Wyborcza” 18–19.07.2015, p. 16.

³⁴ T. Terzani, op.cit., p. 46.

acting out compassion. He wants as much as possible for himself, ignoring the needs of others. Everywhere looking for profit and benefits, he lies to the world, constantly trying to make a better impression of himself. He seeks compassion and understanding, scarcely giving them to others. Sometimes he willingly helps and does good deeds, but immediately looks for someone who would notice and approve it. Being vain, he still seeks acceptance and respect from others. Being cowardly and lazy, he pretends not to see the evil around him. He is just waiting for others to remove the dangers for him and solve the problems of this world. And undoubtedly someone will do it, but usually for money. Because self-interest connects us all, undoubtedly and universally, just as bipedalism and mortality”.³⁵ Therefore, the condition of good peace is removing the above wrongdoings.

The comments presented so far regarding the possibility of good peace as a condition of beneficial globalisation and human well-being aim to suggest that this peace heavily depends on the level of the weakest moral link or links. In this context synthetically fits the statement that “As long as most of us try to save our neighbours from suffering, as long as we stick to a minimum of integrity and computability in relations with other people, life will last”.³⁶ A significant remedy for maintaining the aforementioned minimum and serving against the hypocrisy of people and their helplessness against evil lies in the form of ethics mechanism³⁷, which is to grow out of the spirit that seeks a compromise between overbearing moral beliefs. Such ethics is to be “in dispute with some aspects of public morality and with ethical thoughtlessness, based on disregarding any moral reflection and on taking for granted what is good and what is bad, how to act and what should not be done. Ethics contrasts the arrogance and pride of moral dogmatism with a critical analysis and critical – including with regard to oneself – judgment of moral issues and established judgments”.³⁸ These reflections imply a great need for teaching or education for peace, because in these matters we remain globally illiterate. What arises is the issue of mobilisation for global education as well as for peaceful literacy. An indication concerning the education programme may be found in the Tiziano Terzani’s diagnosis: “The causes of wars lie more often inside us than somewhere outside. They are hidden in such feelings as lust, fear, uncertainty, greed, pride, vanity. We must slowly free ourselves from them. We need to change our approach. Let’s start making decisions that concern us and others, guided more by morality and less by our own interests. More often, let’s do what is right instead of what is convenient for us. Let us teach children honesty,

³⁵ J. Hartman, *Albo etyka, albo ruina*, “Gazeta Wyborcza” 3–4.10.2015, p. 38.

³⁶ Ibid.

³⁷ M. Szyszkowska, *Etyka*, op.cit., pp. 140–141.

³⁸ J. Hartman, op.cit., p. 39.

not cunningness”.³⁹ Peace requires more than just interest in ethics and appropriate teaching, especially when there are real threats to peace, when great crises e.g. economic or political, break out, or when peace is violated by terrorist activities. And it is in this context that Terzani’s question is formulated: “Why don’t we try to look in our minds for something other than brutal and banal solutions – more bombs and more victims? We have extensive knowledge but we do not know our minds, much less our consciences”. The writer wonders about the problem of responding with violence when he addresses Fallaci: “And you, Oriana, you really think that, at the head of the crusade against all those who are not like you or arouse your resentment, you bring us salvation [...]. Do you really think violence is the best way to overcome violence?” He immediately offers an explanation, saying that “like the world, there was no war that would end all wars”. Therefore, he postulates: “imagine a future different from the one we had deluded before September 11, and above all, let us not succumb to the inevitability of anything, especially war, whether as an instrument of justice or just revenge”. Terzani perceives killing as “a murder in every case” and he encourages the discussions about peace as well as introducing a culture of peace to educate young people. In this context he poses the question: “Does history have to be taught only as an endless consequence of wars and slaughter?”⁴⁰ This picture of history occurs when the answer to violence is violence, usually even more cruel. Therefore, in the context of terrorism and wars, the writer raises the issue for the West: why does it not take action that will break the chain of violence? Thus, when expressing the view that “violence breeds violence”, he believes that “Only by breaking this cycle can one hope for a solution, but no one is ready to take the first step”. The writer tried to describe the state of people of Western civilization, saying: “We lost the sense of measure of who we are, how delicate and connected the world we live in is, so let’s not delude ourselves that we can use ‘a more intelligent’ dose of violence to put a stop to terrifying violence of others”.

And so, what arises is the issue of changing the existing approaches and of appropriate state policy. In relation to the latter, Terzani – following Ekkehart Krippendorff – expresses the view that “in its noblest form it stems from being above revenge and that the deepest roots of European culture can be found in some myths about Cain or eras – myths that were to remind people of the need to break the cursed circle of revenge so that civilization can develop. Cain kills his brother, but God prohibits people from taking revenge for Abel, and after appointing Cain – the sign is also a protection – he condemns him to exile, where he will establish the first city. Revenge is

³⁹ T. Terzani, *op.cit.*, p. 172.

⁴⁰ *Ibid*, pp. 37, 70, 171.

not a human matter, it belongs to God". The writer noted that in 2002 "American state interest stands above other principles", but also expressed the conviction that "one day politics will have to re-connect with ethics if we want to live in a better world: better in Asia and Africa, in Timbuktu and in Florence"⁴¹

Criticising the American type of culture, the writer expects a different approach from Europe, of which he says that "it cannot mindlessly follow the United States. Europe must refer to its own history, its own experience of multiculturalism, to find strength for dialogue and not for a clash of cultures". Noticing the greatness of civilisations, among others in "their permeability", he adds that the Europe becomes "much stronger thanks to its moral attitude rather than a new weapon". And he is convinced that "As long as we think that we have a monopoly on 'good' and speak of ourselves as a 'civilised world', ignoring the rest, we will not be on the right path". Embedded in this context is the writer's historical remark that "Two and a half thousand years ago, an Indian, later called enlightened, explained to us the obvious that 'hatred breeds hatred' and that 'hatred can only be fought with love'. Few obeyed him. Maybe it is time to do it". Terzani places history at the base of this expectation, as enabling us to understand that "history repeats itself and that we pay an ever higher price each time". Giving priority to reason would mean "subjugating passions", which is still "more difficult than subjugating the world with weapons". However, using the example of Gandhi's attitude, the writer recognises the possibility of controlling passions. And here he recalls Gandhi's thought of 1925: "Until man voluntarily puts himself last among other creatures on Earth, there will be no rescue for him"⁴² The issue is the conditions enabling peaceful moral conduct, a way of settling disputes. Basing on war experiences, Terzani does not see any alternative for the mechanism of dialogue.⁴³ Its importance is often indicated, which seems to stem from the belief that Kant's state of war can only be ended by conversation.

What seems particularly important, is the basic moral criterion providing sense to the dialogue serving the good peace. It is difficult to question the aforementioned value of a constant reflection on the protection of humanity in everyone, serving as a reason for helping fellow human beings. The criterion of a fellow human being allows us to distance from the so-called political and social reality, characterised by a grand slogan about values that should be protected in a society. Supporters of different values often use the so-called language of hatred, which is seen as "a sense of loss of control, hence these desperate attempts to restore the paradigm rejected by the

⁴¹ Ibid, pp. 38, 51, 106.

⁴² Ibid, pp. 29, 31, 37, 71. 91, 172.

⁴³ Ibid., p. 170.

civilized world a long time ago (patriarchal)”. They manifest themselves in a “massive attack on the progress and achievements of the human mind”. The sense of the ‘openness and dialogue’ paradigm is seen in the era of globalisation. In the case of moral or religious beliefs, a criterion for assessing them is to be ‘helping the fellow human being’,⁴⁴ rather than shallowly manifesting values and imposing a way of life on others. Other criteria are very doubtful as they are not subject to verification. At the root of the changes, Tiziano Terzani places the matter of solving moral issues. Emphasising human evolution, the writer poses a question: “Why can’t we imagine that the same man, thanks to another mutation, could become a more spiritual being, less attached to the material world, more involved in a relationship with another human being and less greedy towards the rest of the universe. Next one: because this evolution is dependent on conscience, why don’t we try to take the first step in this direction now”. In his opinion, spiritual progress did not keep pace with the enormous material progress of humanity, and, what is more, it even deteriorated. Hence, he suggested that humanity consciously reverse this pursuit and regain control over the mind, treated as a unique tool that essentially serves to “learn and master the outside world as if it were the only source of our fleeting happiness”. The task of the mind should also be to draw attention to the inner world.⁴⁵

4. The need for humanistic education of individuals for living in peace: university

Writing his letters about the sense of wisdom for peace, Tiziano Terzani wanted other voices about war to be heard and an important discussion to arise. Several years after their release, one can still see their universality and timeliness, as it remains relevant to bring wisdom and restore the weight of conscience. Developing the topic of the culture of peace and the Socratic mechanism of dialogue that serves it, it can be recalled that nowadays the values of evil, aggression, and criminal demagoguery are trying to counteract the idea of non-violence, which is accompanied by the thought of the sense of education for a better future and a better world. The vision of education conducted in this spirit has a set of its basic concepts. They include, in particular: dialogue, acceptance of otherness, openness, pluralism, and tolerance. The attitude of the man of ‘hope’ is to be expressed by a lack of aggression or hatred, being

⁴⁴ S. Obirek in the interview: *Nie jest przesadą mówienie o iranizacji Polski*, “Gazeta Wyborcza” 18–19.07.2015, p. 31.

⁴⁵ T. Terzani, *op.cit.*, pp. 165–166.

favourable to other people and trying to understand their otherness. This ideal of upbringing reaches for pacifist content. However, a human who follows such attitude, encounters hostility and reality exterminating openness. Ethical philosophy indicating that one should be educated as if the world were deprived of hostile conduct, today turns out to be a vision bordering on utopia. Hence, out of necessity, the attitude of hope must accept an assertive attitude, which assumes the ability of “psychological and socio-technical self-defence”.⁴⁶ It does not mean shaping the attitude of an aggressive man but recognising the importance of the virtue of courage. Such a person will understand when opposition or, for example, a strong appeal to public institutions is necessary. Following the publication of the book by Nobel laureate Olga Tokarczuk entitled *The Book of Jacob*, questioning the myth of Poland’s history as a tolerant state that did no harm to various minorities, there appeared voices criticising the author and her work. The writer faced what some referred to as, a witch hunt. For example, Croatian writer Miljenko Jergović noticed that “a nation – even as large and cultural as Polish one – naturally wants to free itself from the dictate of conscience and morale. Tokarczuk was able to learn the hard way into what a nation changes into when, in the name of conscience and truth, it is called to confront its own history – into a mob”. Basing on her case, Jergović found confirmation that “writers are still the voice of conscience today”. In this way, he referred to the fundamental issue of conscience and a sense of shame. These values are seen as the normative regulator of human actions from the earliest days. It can be recalled that the ancient Greek philosopher – Protagoras, argued that in order to build a state it was necessary to prevent people from the natural desire to hurt each other. Otherwise, this pre-state state of nature or ‘disagreement’ could lead to the destruction of people. To prevent this, Hermes, the messenger of Zeus, was to gift people with shame (*aidos*) and a sense of law (*dikē*). It was thanks to them that state order (political order) and bonds of friendship appeared, and people could lead civilised lives. As for the conscience, it was associated with the thought of the rules of the natural law, morality or shame, providing a reference to law and customs. The sense of decency was placed on conduct including, among others, avoiding misconduct. It was with conscience and a sense of shame that righteousness, equity, order and respect for others were associated. Today, it is estimated that these assets or virtues have been undermined by shamelessness, which is described as rejecting conscience and “a sense of shame in its moral functions”. A shameless person, according to philosopher Barbara Skarga, not only commits evil, but is also not ashamed of acting so, lacking “remorse, he disregards his act as well as the opinions of other people”. Shamelessness has also been

⁴⁶ S. Chwin, *Inteligent jako człowiek bezbronny*, “Tygodnik Powszechny” 20.10.2013, no. 42, p. 3.

included as a category useful for assessing both the sphere of morality and politics as well as for analysing people's activities in various areas of social and economic life. The basis for the development of shamelessness is especially breaking of the continuity of social norms, sparked by various criminal events on a large scale not only in the 20th but also in the 21st century.⁴⁷

It follows from the above remarks that the problem of peace is a problem of the ability to live in it, to teach it and to educate for it. Studies of peace in the areas of political science, statistics, economics, law, morality, logic, psychology, and sociology addressed various aspects of the phenomenon. In some ways they even taught and are still teaching peace, yet they are not enough for the practice of living in peace. Rationality alone is not enough. Great progress in overcoming violence came when the mechanisms of empathy appeared, when progress was made in understanding the suffering of others. Literature and poetry, increasingly addressing these issues, along with the reason of Enlightenment, broke the millennia barriers of moral and religious principles.⁴⁸ After the Second World War, the 20th century opened many human rights' doors but violence is still prospering, using various moral or ideological justifications, namely the prestige of the state, its *raison d'état*, eternal rights of the nation or people to religious, group-moral or individual argumentation extraordinariness. Whether in the form of great ideologies or religions, totalitarian morals are poor or sometimes entirely unsuitable for education for peace. Their one-sidedness and orientation to supporters of a certain vision, fanatics or followers usually come into conflict with other axiological concepts. The pursuit of universalisation of ideology means competing with other similar aspirations. Therefore, even the most anti-violence oriented priests can restrain the hyperactivity of the supporters of their common vision only to some extent. They fail to remove the axiological source of the dispute. Positive programmes for all, based on a specific ideology, religion or worldview are even weaker. This remark also applies to the so-called state initiators of a better and peaceful world. The peace of states and power exists by definition only within certain limits, as, after all, they are institutions of coercion, and their officers often serve violence. For this reason, states and politicians generally do not cater for the conditions to build truly positive peace programmes. Therefore, all subjects of power, politics, ideology and religions may be characterised as groups lobbying for a specific vision of peace, i.e. serving their interest. It is understandable that the

⁴⁷ M. Środa, *Obywatel kaliban się nudzi*, "Gazeta Wyborcza" 9–10.5.2015, p. 13.

⁴⁸ S. Pinker, *Zmierzch przemocy*, trans. T. Biedroń, Zysk i S-ka, Poznań 2015, pp. 120ff., 228–237, 729ff., 740ff.; T. Maruszewski, *Przedmowa*, [in:] S. Baron-Cohen, *Teoria zła. O empatii i genezie okrucieństwa tłumu*, trans. A. Nowak, Sopot 2015, p. 10, 14; S. Baron-Cohen, *Teoria zła ...*, pp. 32–34, 165; J. Oniszczyk, *Przemoc – Pokój – Prawa człowieka*, Oficyna Wydawnicza SGH, Warszawa 2016, p. 262ff.

absolute thought of peace and a non-violent world is an idea to which everyone can contribute. But moulding this activity in some institutional framework or in some organisational structures has a chance of some success, as long as this activity and its forms are independent of the pressure of various interests, and provided it appears in the area of freedom of world society, and especially the freedom of teaching. It is probably difficult to imagine the operation of global social organisations free of various entanglements but linking these entities to the authority of universities rather than to the structures of various international, state or religious authorities may make sense, especially when the basic principle of the organisation will be of non-commercial and reliable character.

From various remarks, the observation emerges that some minimum of individual rights is necessary for counteracting violence and for maintaining peace. And probably commonly agreed human rights account for such a universal minimum. But they alone will not teach individuals to live in peace. They will not undertake teaching and upbringing that would appeal both to the logic of the open mind of an individual and society, as well as to their understanding of the experience of each person (empathy). The catalogue of even the best freedoms and rights will not rebuild conscience or shame, nor will it overcome shamelessness. And, to paraphrase the famous saying, it can be said that peace and the problem of violence are too serious to be left in the hands of amateur politicians, professional uniformed services or the so-called legal protection system.

Reflections on evil do not provide any medicine that will cure it easily. Nevertheless, one can deduce on their basis the need to maintain and develop a permanent mechanism of resistance against evil with the awareness that it shall not be radicalised. However, what clearly serves the positive aspect is the necessity of non-violent education at university or even school or non-formal education of ideologically uncontaminated nature. So far, such a positive – and the only real one – value has been humanity, with peace being the foundation for the protection of this value. In other words, the sense of this education is to recognise that the basis for protecting man and his existence is accepting the value of humanity and its condition in the form of peace. It is hard to expect that this programme can, in essence, be undertaken by universities training in defence, police or law. There are many such schools and colleges around the world training for a professional fight against certain types of evil. Unfortunately, there is no university system training professionals with a positive programme of studies regarding peace and non-violent global coexistence. This vision still seems utopian. Around the world, there are indeed museums of wars, uprisings, and genocides. Undoubtedly, we need places that would be able to generate positive knowledge and suggest ways to reduce oppression. But museums will

not handle this task. And reality, as mentioned, constantly invents new forms of violence. New perpetrators of appalling violence in the form of financial and economic corporations are likely to be sincerely moved by the medieval burning of witches or to exhibit thorough care about wounded animals, but fail to see the connection between their 'work' for the glory of profit and the criminal conflicts in the world that they produce, thus damaging ecosystem.

The above remarks imply shaping a new human consciousness, crucial for peace, human environment, and individual rights. Currently, the carelessness of industrialists and markets along with the pursuit of profit corrupt the political world, whereas economic coercion coupled with ignorance of the so-called ordinary people have led to an unprecedented situation directly endangering the survival of people on the Earth. Following Socrates we may see ignorance as the source of evil. An expression of the aforementioned wisdom is also expressed in one of general beliefs of UNESCO, stating that "Wars begin in the minds of people, which is where the foundations of peace should be built". To conclude, teaching and learning for peace, against violence and for the environment are possible in a 'decent school', in which the society will invest perceiving it as the foundation of its future.

Reason can promote life without violence and shape activities towards such a world but it can also be a tool enabling the pursuit of a goal in the form of struggle. The importance of reason for acting for peace and violence is demonstrated by comparing its effectiveness in this respect with the possibilities of moral sense, self-control, and empathy. Other pacifist factors proved to have too limited an impact. It is solely the reason that does not remain closed, and what it more, once open, it is ready to create various possibilities. It can go beyond the limits of traditional empathy when it thinks how to transform the compassion of one victim into a general category, enabling the care of many people, or how to transform compassion into political and legal activity. Thus, in the reason of the person caring for their own interests and possessing the ability to communicate with others, one sees their own mechanism of logical action, which focuses on taking into account the interests of an increasing number of people. In addition, the reason itself examining its previous reasoning, may discover the disadvantages of earlier findings and make appropriate improvements. Exogenous peace factors and the reasoning factor are to some extent really similar; especially so with regard to education, cosmopolitanism and literacy.⁴⁹ It is the role of the mind and its dialogical argumentation in conditions of freedom of speech that is associated with achieving a humanistic level of values, at the basis of which lay the autonomy and prosperity of both individual as well as human rights. They would

⁴⁹ S. Pinker, *Zmierzch ...*, pp. 847, 874–876.

seemingly be the most conducive to leaving full tribal oppression, embraced by the values of power (authority) and holiness (purity) of the world.

Universities hold a unique institutional importance for maintaining the significance of a rational and scientific critical approach to all phenomena. It was there that the rejection of ideologies discriminating, dehumanising, and demonising people occurred. By design, university is a place of concern for a wise view of the human world. Scientific means of researching and uncovering inconsistencies reveal the real causes of problems related to violence between people (among which unfair differentiation stands out). It was scientific philosophy that gave rise to the arguments which were used to build modern humanistic visions of freedom and human rights. Especially the open university turned out to be the core of an open society, operating as a litmus test of the society and the state. Its universality and elitism consist in opposing populist prejudices. University combats stigmatisation, questions stereotypes and habits which contain aversion to other people for discriminatory reasons, be it national, religious or social. It can perform its functions only when it is fully open to ideas, rejecting violence and discrimination on any grounds. In other words, university needs to function as a place of mutual respect. Therefore, it is especially in such a place that reflection on the anti-violence role of reason is possible.

A special issue of scientific nature is, however, how reason can serve to reduce the level of violence and promote peace. Otherwise, it is an ideological or religious school that misleads its character by hiding behind the name of the university or academy. Even more often the name 'university' is the facade of corporations that have abandoned scientific standards in favour of trade in diplomas. Nowadays, due to the lack of awareness and knowledge of people concerning violence, even the politicians of the world science trade centre, the United States, complain when they notice that the root of numerous problems is the fact that: "As a society, we decided not to invest in decent schools".⁵⁰

The question arises how abandoning the notion of decency in teaching and learning happened. It can be recalled that in the last decades of the 20th century, the idea of developing cooperation between industry and university and modernising the latter more often than not resulted in trading products 'wrapped up' as 'knowledge' rather than exchanging thoughts between the worlds. University took the form of a supermarket in which the packaging, not necessarily the content, became important. Supporters of the university revival, e.g. in the USA, did not perceive the threat that the outcome of university-economy relations, i.e. contracts between the rich and the poor, would be control-based research. Writing about this issue in 1996, Terzani

⁵⁰ B. Obama, *To jest moja Ameryka*, "Gazeta Wyborcza" 16-17 July 2016, p. 15.

reminded that “The great advantages of the university include the fact that it is the kingdom of freedom: freedom of thinking, freedom of search, including impractical search. Meanwhile, industry is, by its very nature, interested in looking for useful things and benefits”. And that is why he asked: “How is it possible that in this alliance the richer or stronger would not influence the other, make them addicted or subordinate them?”⁵¹ a question which till this day has remained universal. Similarly, in the postliberal model, since the Reagan era, states, by ‘politically’ controlling research grants, have left teaching to market mechanisms, guided by the principle of the lowest possible costs. Economy-managed education, according to narrowly economic criteria or clerical plans, generates social losses.

A significant issue is the content of the curriculum for peace studies. The postulated continuous and professional education for peace should not be merely an examination of all situations that cause harm. Science that has led human civilisation into the ‘sky’ no longer must follow the path of technical trial and error. Its rational achievements make it possible to propose a programme of universal changes, which can lead the vision of the universality of peace and a sufficiently high level of freedom and human rights out of the area of utopian concepts. It is able to offer a more coherent and structured programme of cooperation to civic movements to a different extent caring for the natural environment and human beings in the world, as well as to present content for their dialogue with people, e.g. egoistically treating resources on the Earth. This is probably not the most energetic way to achieve results immediately, as these are basically possible but only in the form of omnipotent imperious indications. However, the characteristics of such a ‘direct action’ are very much associated with the hopeless experiences of utopian ideas of the 20th century. In spite of that, some academic urgency is taking place, which is associated with, among others, research into an economic concept that could best serve peace and be against violence or postliberal socio-economic order.

It can be recalled that the establishment of the League of Nations after World War I in 1919 to “establish universal peace”, was based on the belief that “this peace can only be built on the principles of social justice”.⁵² The fundamental significance of the principles of social justice for peace refers not only to the situation between states but applies particularly to the existence of each individual, an existence which requires constant care. Reflecting on ‘being’, Barbara Skarga referred to Heidegger and Husserl, considering the view that “being is a concern” directed towards “one’s

⁵¹ T. Terzani, *W Azji*, trans. J. Wajs, Grupa Wydawnicza Foksal, Warszawa 2016, pp. 416–417.

⁵² R. Kuźniar, *Wstęp*, [in:] R. Lemkin, *Rzeczy państw Osi w okupowanej Europie*, Warszawa 2013, p. 17.

own possibility of being the most” too narrow.⁵³ The general reflection on being suggests that the curriculum of peace studies and their teaching, should deal with concern for every single individual. In this approach, international law and freedom of an individual are a minimum. The reflection on care, its teaching and friendly dissemination around the world is probably a contemporary addition to utopia.⁵⁴ However, also in a situation of a widespread threat to the existence of everyone, it seems to have no alternative and, despite Barbara Skarga’s observation about the envious nature of man and his/her distrust, it does stand a chance. Nevertheless, the remark does not exclude, in an increasingly less secure world for both everyone and each single human being, the positive sense of teaching care towards others because it gives the irresistible impression that it is, at the same time, taking care of oneself.

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⁵³ B. Skarga, *Tercet metafizyczny*, Wydawnictwo Znak, Kraków 2009, pp. 64–65.

⁵⁴ Only an idealist, as B. Skarga wrote (*Tercet metafizyczny...*, p. 165 and ff.) “can dream of building a world based on love. Along with love, envy or suspicion immediately arise”.

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