Do large Polish cities substitute their own-source revenues with fees and user charges?
Article Sidebar
Published:
Jan 19, 2020
Keywords:
fees, user charges, local budgets, tax and non-tax revenues
Main Article Content
Abstract
This paper aims to assess if large Polish cities use fees and user charges to substitute other own-source revenues. The analysis has been conducted on a panel of 65 large cities in Poland in the period of 2004-2015. Using OLS and fixed effect panel analysis, it has been proved that cities pursue their policy in order to maximize their revenues, which is in line with the Leviathan theory assuming that public authorities maximize public revenues. Additionally, using the normalization quotient mapping, it has been confirmed that cities do not change their revenue policy in terms of taxes vs. fees and user charges trade-offs.
Downloads
Download data is not yet available.
Article Details
How to Cite
Będzieszak, M. . (2020). Do large Polish cities substitute their own-source revenues with fees and user charges?. Journal of Management and Financial Sciences, (39), 43–59. https://doi.org/10.33119/JMFS.2019.39.4
Section
Articles
References
1. Aaberge, R., Lang0ren, A. (2006). Measuring the benefits from public services: the effects of local government spending on the distribution of income in Norway. Review of Income and Wealth, No. 52(1), pp. 61-83.
2. Altshuler, A.A., Gómez-Ibanez, J.A., Howitt, A.M. (1993). Regulation for revenue: The politi- cal economy of land use exactions. Cambridge, MA and Washington, DC: Lincoln Institute of Land Policy and: The Brookings Institution.
3. Bardhan, P., Mookherjee, D. (2006). Decentralisation and accountability in infrastructure delivery in developing countries. The Economic Journal, No. 116(508), pp. 101-127.
4. Bartle, J.R., Ebdon, C., Krane, D. (2003). Beyond the property tax: Local government revenue diversification. Journal of Public Budgeting, Accounting & Financial Management, No. 15 (4), pp. 622-648.
5. Bartle, J.R., Kriz, K.A., Morozov, B. (2011). Local government revenue structure: trends and challenges. Journal of Public Budgeting, Accounting & Financial Management, No. 23 (2), pp. 268-287.
6. Bird, R.M. (1993). Threading the fiscal labyrinth: some issues in fiscal decentralization. National Tax Journal, No. 46 (2), pp. 207-227.
7. Borge, L.E. (2000). Charging for public services: the case of Utilities in Norwegian local gov- ernments. Regional Science and Urban Economics, No. 30 (6), pp. 703-718.
8. Brazer, H.E. (1958). The Role of Major Metropolitan Centers in State and Local Finance. The American Economic Review, No. 48(2), pp. 305-316.
9. Buchanan, J.M. (1980). The Collected Works of James M. Buchanan, Vol. 9 (The Power to Tax: Analytical Foundations of a Fiscal Constitution). Indianapolis: Liberty Fund.
10. Denek, E., Sobiech, J., Wolniak, J. (2001). Finanse publiczne, Warszawa: PWN.
11. Kosek-Wojnar, M., Surówka, K. (2007). Podstawy finansów samorządu terytorialnego. Warszawa: Wydawnictwo Naukowe PWN.
12. Lubińska, T. (Ed.) (2005). Budżet państwa i samorządów. Decentralizacja - oświata - studium porównawcze. Warszawa: Difin.
13. Carroll, D.A. (2009). Diversifying Municipal Government Revenue Structures: Fiscal Illusion or Instability? Public Budgeting & Finance, No. 29(1), pp. 27-48.
14. Carroll, D.A., Johnson, T. (2010). Examining Small Town Revenues: To What Extent Are They Diversified? Public Administration Review, No. 70(2), pp. 223-235.
15. Chernick, H., Langley, A., Reschovsky, A. (2011). Revenue diversification and the financing of large American central cities. Public Finance and Management, No. 11(2), pp. 138-159.
16. City of Fort Lauderdale (2008). Fort Lauderdale Parks and Recreation Long Range Strategic Plan. Retrieved from: http://www.fortlauderdale.gov/life/strategic_plan/index.htm [accessed: 16.07.2018].
17. Ciupek, B., Kania P. (2015). Determinanty reguł fiskalnych w zarządzaniu zadłużeniem jed-nostek samorządowych. Prace Naukowe Uniwersytetu Ekonomicznego we Wrocławiu, No. 404, pp. 37-52.
18. DiLorenzo, T.J. (1982). Utility profits, fiscal illusion, and local public expenditures. Public Choice, No. 38, pp. 243-252.
19. Feld, L.P., Kirchgassner, G., Schaltegger, C.A. (2010). Decentralized Taxation and the Size of Government: Evidence from Swiss State and Local Governments. Southern Economic Journal, No. 77 (1), pp. 27-48.
20. Heller, J. (2006). Samodzielność finansowa samorządów terytorialnych w Polsce. Studia Regionalne i Lokalne, No. 2(24), pp. 137-151.
21. Hendrick, R. (2002). Revenue Diversification: Fiscal Illusion or Flexible Financial Manage- ment. Public Budgeting & Finance, No. 22(4), pp. 52-72.
22. Heyndels, B., Smolders, C. (1994). Fiscal illusion at the local level: Empirical evidence for the Flemish municipalities. Public Choice, No. 80, pp. 325-338.
23. Huber, B., Runkel, M. (2009). Tax competition, excludable public goods, and user charges. International Tax and Public Finance, No. 16(3), pp. 321-336.
24. Jang, H.S., Kwon, M. (2014). Enterprising government: the political and financial effects of fee-supported municipal services. Public Administration Quarterly, No. 38(2), pp. 128-162.
25. Jung, C. Bae, S. (2012). Changing Revenue and Expenditure Structure and the Reliance on User Charges and Fees in American Counties. 1972-2002. The American Review of Public Administration, No. 42(2), pp. 170-185.
26. Musgrave, R.A. (1983). Who Should Tax, Where, and What? [In:] Charles E. McLure, Jr. (Ed.). Tax Assignment in Federal Countries. Canberra: Centre for Research on Federal Financial Relations, Australian National University.
27. OECD (2013). OECD Regions at a Glance 2013. Paris: OECD Publishing.
28. Schunk, D., Porca, S. (2005). State-local revenue diversification, stability, and growth: Time series evidence. The Review of Regional Studies, No. 35(3), pp. 246-265.
29. Sun, R., Jung, C. (2012). Does User-Charge Financing Reduce Expenditure Levels for the Charge-Financed Services? The American Review of Public Administration, No. 42(2), pp. 170-185.
30. Werwińska, A. (2014). Nowe zasady limitowania długu jednostek samorządu terytorialnego a ich zdolność do zaciągania zobowiązań. Zeszyty Naukowe Wyższej Szkoły Bankowej we Wrocławiu, No. 3(41), pp. 183-196.
31. Winter, S., Mouritzen, P.E. (2001). Why people want something for nothing: The role of asymmetrical illusions. European Journal of Political Research, No. 39, pp. 109-143.
32. Yan, W. (2012). The impact of revenue diversification and economic base on state revenue stability. Journal of Public Budgeting, Accounting & Financial Management, No. 24(1), pp. 58-81.
2. Altshuler, A.A., Gómez-Ibanez, J.A., Howitt, A.M. (1993). Regulation for revenue: The politi- cal economy of land use exactions. Cambridge, MA and Washington, DC: Lincoln Institute of Land Policy and: The Brookings Institution.
3. Bardhan, P., Mookherjee, D. (2006). Decentralisation and accountability in infrastructure delivery in developing countries. The Economic Journal, No. 116(508), pp. 101-127.
4. Bartle, J.R., Ebdon, C., Krane, D. (2003). Beyond the property tax: Local government revenue diversification. Journal of Public Budgeting, Accounting & Financial Management, No. 15 (4), pp. 622-648.
5. Bartle, J.R., Kriz, K.A., Morozov, B. (2011). Local government revenue structure: trends and challenges. Journal of Public Budgeting, Accounting & Financial Management, No. 23 (2), pp. 268-287.
6. Bird, R.M. (1993). Threading the fiscal labyrinth: some issues in fiscal decentralization. National Tax Journal, No. 46 (2), pp. 207-227.
7. Borge, L.E. (2000). Charging for public services: the case of Utilities in Norwegian local gov- ernments. Regional Science and Urban Economics, No. 30 (6), pp. 703-718.
8. Brazer, H.E. (1958). The Role of Major Metropolitan Centers in State and Local Finance. The American Economic Review, No. 48(2), pp. 305-316.
9. Buchanan, J.M. (1980). The Collected Works of James M. Buchanan, Vol. 9 (The Power to Tax: Analytical Foundations of a Fiscal Constitution). Indianapolis: Liberty Fund.
10. Denek, E., Sobiech, J., Wolniak, J. (2001). Finanse publiczne, Warszawa: PWN.
11. Kosek-Wojnar, M., Surówka, K. (2007). Podstawy finansów samorządu terytorialnego. Warszawa: Wydawnictwo Naukowe PWN.
12. Lubińska, T. (Ed.) (2005). Budżet państwa i samorządów. Decentralizacja - oświata - studium porównawcze. Warszawa: Difin.
13. Carroll, D.A. (2009). Diversifying Municipal Government Revenue Structures: Fiscal Illusion or Instability? Public Budgeting & Finance, No. 29(1), pp. 27-48.
14. Carroll, D.A., Johnson, T. (2010). Examining Small Town Revenues: To What Extent Are They Diversified? Public Administration Review, No. 70(2), pp. 223-235.
15. Chernick, H., Langley, A., Reschovsky, A. (2011). Revenue diversification and the financing of large American central cities. Public Finance and Management, No. 11(2), pp. 138-159.
16. City of Fort Lauderdale (2008). Fort Lauderdale Parks and Recreation Long Range Strategic Plan. Retrieved from: http://www.fortlauderdale.gov/life/strategic_plan/index.htm [accessed: 16.07.2018].
17. Ciupek, B., Kania P. (2015). Determinanty reguł fiskalnych w zarządzaniu zadłużeniem jed-nostek samorządowych. Prace Naukowe Uniwersytetu Ekonomicznego we Wrocławiu, No. 404, pp. 37-52.
18. DiLorenzo, T.J. (1982). Utility profits, fiscal illusion, and local public expenditures. Public Choice, No. 38, pp. 243-252.
19. Feld, L.P., Kirchgassner, G., Schaltegger, C.A. (2010). Decentralized Taxation and the Size of Government: Evidence from Swiss State and Local Governments. Southern Economic Journal, No. 77 (1), pp. 27-48.
20. Heller, J. (2006). Samodzielność finansowa samorządów terytorialnych w Polsce. Studia Regionalne i Lokalne, No. 2(24), pp. 137-151.
21. Hendrick, R. (2002). Revenue Diversification: Fiscal Illusion or Flexible Financial Manage- ment. Public Budgeting & Finance, No. 22(4), pp. 52-72.
22. Heyndels, B., Smolders, C. (1994). Fiscal illusion at the local level: Empirical evidence for the Flemish municipalities. Public Choice, No. 80, pp. 325-338.
23. Huber, B., Runkel, M. (2009). Tax competition, excludable public goods, and user charges. International Tax and Public Finance, No. 16(3), pp. 321-336.
24. Jang, H.S., Kwon, M. (2014). Enterprising government: the political and financial effects of fee-supported municipal services. Public Administration Quarterly, No. 38(2), pp. 128-162.
25. Jung, C. Bae, S. (2012). Changing Revenue and Expenditure Structure and the Reliance on User Charges and Fees in American Counties. 1972-2002. The American Review of Public Administration, No. 42(2), pp. 170-185.
26. Musgrave, R.A. (1983). Who Should Tax, Where, and What? [In:] Charles E. McLure, Jr. (Ed.). Tax Assignment in Federal Countries. Canberra: Centre for Research on Federal Financial Relations, Australian National University.
27. OECD (2013). OECD Regions at a Glance 2013. Paris: OECD Publishing.
28. Schunk, D., Porca, S. (2005). State-local revenue diversification, stability, and growth: Time series evidence. The Review of Regional Studies, No. 35(3), pp. 246-265.
29. Sun, R., Jung, C. (2012). Does User-Charge Financing Reduce Expenditure Levels for the Charge-Financed Services? The American Review of Public Administration, No. 42(2), pp. 170-185.
30. Werwińska, A. (2014). Nowe zasady limitowania długu jednostek samorządu terytorialnego a ich zdolność do zaciągania zobowiązań. Zeszyty Naukowe Wyższej Szkoły Bankowej we Wrocławiu, No. 3(41), pp. 183-196.
31. Winter, S., Mouritzen, P.E. (2001). Why people want something for nothing: The role of asymmetrical illusions. European Journal of Political Research, No. 39, pp. 109-143.
32. Yan, W. (2012). The impact of revenue diversification and economic base on state revenue stability. Journal of Public Budgeting, Accounting & Financial Management, No. 24(1), pp. 58-81.