On the possibility of artificial uncertainty in the leader-follower game


Maciej K. Dudek


In this paper we study equilibrium dynamics in a simple duopoly game. We show that the beliefs about the structure of the game influence the actual dynamics. Furthermore, we argue that beliefs induced dynamics can be complex and can in equilibrium be consistent with the underlying beliefs. We illustrate that the beliefs can be consistent even if the underlying beliefs do not correspond to the objective truth.(original abstract)




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