Polityka pieniężna a polityczny cykl koniunkturalny
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Abstract
Literature provides many theories explaining the existence of business situation by means of political factors. The theories assume that politicians attempt to influence economy making use of macroeconomic policy instruments. Among others monetary policy of the central back is considered such an instrument by many researches. This paper is aiming at an attempted analysis of monetary policy from the perspective of political economic cycle. Putting forward a hypothesis of a possibility of the central bank's using discretion instruments inducing fluctuations of political nature in economy, the author has reviewed the monetary policy theory, notably focusing on its institutional aspects. Special consideration has been also given to independence of the central bank. Basing on the empirical research findings regarding potential use of monetary policy instruments such as interest rate, money supply and intervention in foreign exchange market in the mechanism of business cycle creation, the author tries to address a question whether monetary policy might induce measures to be taken within politically motivated economic fluctuations. The study contacted has failed to fully address the question whether central banks might be a source of fluctuation of politic nature. It has turned out impossible to prove that the observed changes to short-term interest rate, size of currency aggregates or exchange rate are caused by monetary authority measures only, the analysis of empirical research proves, however, that fluctuations in cycles which time proximity to election cycles do really exist. (original abstract)
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