Wybrane teorie umów kredytowych – przegląd badań

Main Article Content

Andrzej Paliński

Abstract

The article reviews theoretical studies on the loan agreement. First, the resultsof researches in the area of the costly state verification models proving optimalityof the standard debt contract in conditions of information asymmetry and existence of costs of verification of the debtor’s outcomes were analysed. Followedby analysis of the models included in the mainstream of the incomplete contracttheory, which assume unpredictability of nature and the need to take into accountthe role of collateral and the liquidation value on the loan repayment. The focuswas also placed on researches taking into account the impact of debt renegotiationand long lender-borrower relationship on the behaviour of the borrower duringthe repayment of the debt.

Downloads

Download data is not yet available.

Article Details

How to Cite
Paliński, A. (2015). Wybrane teorie umów kredytowych – przegląd badań. Kwartalnik Kolegium Ekonomiczno-Społecznego. Studia I Prace, 2(3), 113–125. https://doi.org/10.33119/KKESSiP.2015.2.3.8
Section
Articles

References

Aghion P., Bolton P., An Incomplete Contracts Approach to Financial Contracting, “Reviewof Economic Studies” 1992, Vol. 59, No. 3.
Barro R., The Loan Market, Collateral, and Rates of Interest, “Journal of Money, Credit andBanking” 1976, Vol. 8, No. 4.
Berger A., Black L., Bank Size, Lending Technologies, and Small Business Finance, “Journalof Banking and Finance” 2011, Vol. 35.
Berger A., Espinosa-Vega M., Frame S., Miller N., Why Do Borrowers Pledge Collateral?New Empirical Evidence on the Role of Asymmetric Information, “Journal of FinancialIntermediation” 2011, Vol. 20.
Besanko D., Thakor A., Collateral and rationing: sorting equilibria in monopolistic and competitivecredit markets, “International Economic Review” 1987, Vol. 28, No. 3.
Bester H., Screening vs. rationing in credit markets with imperfect information, „The AmericanEconomic Review” 1985, Vol. 75, No. 4.
Bester H., The Role of Collateral in a Model of Debt Renegotiation, “Journal of Money, Creditand Banking” 1994, Vol. 26, No. 1.
Bolton P., Scharfstein D., Optimal Debt Structure and the Number of Creditors, “The Journalof Political Economy” 1996, Vol. 104, No. 1.
Boot A., Thakor A., Udell G., Secured Lending and Default Risk: Equilibrium Analysis, PolicyImplications and Empirical Results, “The Economic Journal” 1991, Vol. 101, No. 406.
Boot A., Thakor A., Moral hazard and an secured lending in infinitely repeated market game,“International Economic Review” 1994, Vol. 35, No. 4.
Border K., Sobel J., Samurai Accountant: A Theory of Auditing and Plunder, “Review ofEconomics Studies” 1987, Vol. 54, No. 4.
Brick I., Palia I., Evidence of jointness in the terms of relationship lending, “Journal of FinancialIntermediation” 2007, Vol. 16.
Carlier, G., Renou, L., A Costly State Verification Model with Diversity of Options, “EconomicTheory” 2005, Vol. 25.
Choe C., A Mechanism Design Approach to an Optimal Contract Under Ex Ante and ExPost Private Information, “Review of Economic Design” 1998, Vol. 3.
Coco G., On the use of collateral, “Journal of Economic Surveys” 2000, Vol. 14, No. 2.
Clemenz G., Credit Markets with Asymmetric Information, “Lecture Notes in Economicsand Mathematical Systems”, Springer, Berlin-Heidelberg 1986.
Freixas X., Rochet J.‑C., Microeconomics of Banking, The MIT Press, Cambridge 1997.
Gale D., Hellwig M., Incentive-compatible Debt Contracts, The One-Period Problem, “TheReview of Economics Studies” 1985, Vol. 52.
Gorton G., Kahn J., The design of bank loan contracts, “Review of Financial Studies” 2000,No. 13.
Hart O., Moore J., A Theory of Debt Based on the Inalienability of Human Capital, “TheQuarterly Journal of Economics” 1994, Vol. 109, No. 4.
Hart O., Moore J., Default and renegotiation: a dynamic model of debt, “The QuarterlyJournal of Economics” 1998, Vol. 113, No. 1.
Hvide H., Leite T., Optimal debt contracts under costly enforcement, “Economic Theory”2010, Vol. 44.
Jimenez G., Salas V., Saurina J., Determinants of collateral, “Journal of Financial Economics”2006, Vol. 81.
Krasa S., Villamil A., Optimal Contracts when Enforcement is a Decision Variable, “Econometrica”2000, Vol. 68, No. 1.
Lacker J., Collateralized Debt as the Optimal Contract, “Review of Economic Design” 2001,Vol. 4.
Mookherjee D., Png I., Optimal Auditing, Insurance and Redistribution, “Quarterly Journalof Economics” 1989, Vol. 104, No. 2.
Niinimaki J., Nominal and true cost of loan collateral, “Journal of Banking and Finance”2011, Vol. 35.
Paliński A., Analiza ekonomicznych warunków umowy kredytowej w ujęciu teorii gier,Wydawnictwo Uniwersytetu Ekonomicznego, Katowice 2013.
Snyder C., Optimal Long Term Contracts in a Costly State Verification Model, MIT Press,Cambridge 2001.
Thakor A., Wilson P., Capital Requirements, Loan Renegotiation and The Borrower’s Choiceof Financing Source, “Journal of Banking and Finance” 1995, Vol. 19.
Townsend R., Optimal contracts and competitive markets with costly state verification, “Journalof Economic Theory” 1979, Vol. 21.
Webb D., Two-Period Financial Contracts with Private Information and Costly State Verification,“Quarterly Journal of Economics” 1992, Vol. 107, No. 3.
Williamson S., Costly Monitoring, Loan Contracts, and Equilibrium Credit Rationing, “QuarterlyJournal of Economics” 1987, Vol. 102, No. 1.