Polityka fiskalna i monetarna w obliczu współczesnego kryzysu gospodarczego

Abstract

This paper discusses the financial crisis of 2007–2009, which has been called the  worst financial crisis since the Great Depression by leading economists and has  contributed to the failure of key businesses, declines in consumer wealth estimated  at trillions of U.S. dollars, substantial financial burdens incurred by governments  and a significant decline in economic activity. Experts have proposed many  causes of this crisis, but both macro- and microeconomic circumstances need to  be enumerated. The immediate cause or “trigger” of the crisis was the bursting  of the United States housing bubble. The crisis rapidly developed and spread into  a global economic shock, resulting in a number of European bank failures, declines  in various stock indexes and large reductions in the market value of equities and  commodities. Moreover, the de-leveraging of financial institutions, resulting in  asset sales to pay back obligations that could not be refinanced in frozen credit  markets, further accelerated the liquidity crisis and caused a decrease in international  trade. World political leaders, national ministers of finance and central  bank directors coordinated their eff orts to reduce fears, but the crisis continued,  leading many emergent economies to seek aid from the IMF. During September  2008, the crisis hit its most critical stage. There was the equivalent of a bank run  on money market mutual funds, which frequently invest in commercial paper  issued by corporations to fund their operations and payrolls. The financial crisis,  which has spread across all global markets, has not been without impact on  Poland, but our economic foundations are rather stable. A large part of Poland’s  comparatively positive outcome is the fact that Polish banks have never dealt in  all the sophisticated instruments used by U.S. financial institutions. As indicators  showed, Poland wrote down a highest economic growth in EU.