The concept of information supervision
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Abstract
This article presents the concept of information supervision in the context of corporate governance, supervision and management of IT in the enterprise information systems. The definition of information supervision proposed by the author can highlight the difference between supervision of IT systems, and information systems. The presented model of information supervision can serve both to analyze, and to shape deliberately the information supervision in an enterprise. Announcing further research on the concept and model of information supervision the author shows, that particularly interesting seem to be searching for methods to measure the maturity of information supervision, and the application of specific rules and mechanisms of such supervision impact on the company efficiency.
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