Central counterparties from the perspective of economic analysis of law
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Published:
Jan 1, 2015
Keywords:
central counterparties, economic analysis of law, CCP
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Abstract
This article presents the concept of information supervision in the context of corporate governance, supervision and management of IT in the enterprise information systems. The definition of information supervision proposed by the author can highlight the difference between supervision of IT systems, and information systems. The presented model of information supervision can serve both to analyze, and to shape deliberately the information supervision in an enterprise. Announcing further research on the concept and model of information supervision the author shows, that particularly interesting seem to be searching for methods to measure the maturity of information supervision, and the application of specific rules and mechanisms of such supervision impact on the company efficiency.
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Szpringer, M., & Szpringer, W. (2015). Central counterparties from the perspective of economic analysis of law. Kwartalnik Nauk O Przedsiębiorstwie, 34(1), 15–35. Retrieved from https://econjournals.sgh.waw.pl/KNoP/article/view/1951
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References
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Vertragsschluss an der Frankfurter Wertpapierbörse mittels des elektronischen Handelssystems Xetra unter
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„Kredit & Rating. Praxis“, No. 5.
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dostęp 28/01/2015.
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Brussels.
10. ECB [2007], The Role of Central Counterparties. Issues Related to Central Counterparty Clearing,
ECB-FED Chicago Conference, European Central Bank, July.
11. Economides N. [1993], Network Economics with Application to Finance, “Financial Markets, Institutions
& Instruments”, Vol.2, No. 5.
12. Eckhardt P. [2012], EU-Verordnung MIFIR, CEP, Analyse, Nr. 16.04.
13. ESMA [2014], Post-trading/Clearing and Reporting EMIR, ESMA, www.esma.europa.eu/page/
post-trading, dostęp 20/01/2015.
14. Ferrarini G.A., Saguato P. [2014], Regulating Financial Market Infrastructure, European Corporate
Governance Institute, Law Working Paper No. 259/2014, June, 2014.
15. Fontaine J.S., Perez-Saiz H.P., Slive J. [2012], Competition and Strategic Control of the Central Counterparty.
When Lower Risk Increases Profit, Bank of Canada Working Paper, No. 35, November.
16. Fontaine J.S., Saiz H.P., Slive J. [2012], Access, Competition and Risk in Centrally Cleared Markets,
“Bank of Canada Review”, Autumn.
17. FSB [2012], OTC Derivatives Market Reforms: Third Progress Report on Implementation, Financial
Stability Board, June, Statement of the BIS Economic Consultative Committee, www.financialstabilityboard.
org/publications/r_120615.pdf, dostęp 20/01/2015.
18. FSI [2014], Financial System Inquiry. Final Report, Commonwealth of Australia, November.
19. Glasserman P., Peyton H.Y. [2013], How Likely is Contagion in Financial Networks?, University of
Oxford, Discussion Papers Series, No. 642, March, 2013.
20. Gomber P., Jäger B., MiFID: Eine systematische Analyse der Zielerreichung, „Zeitschrift für Bankrecht
und Bankwirtschaft”, 2014, No. 1.
21. Greenberger M., [2012], The Extraterritorial Provisions of the Dodd-Frank Act Protects U.S. Taxpayers
from Worldwide Bailouts, works.bepress.com/michael_greenberger/47/, dostęp 20/01/2015.
22. Greene E.F., Potiha I. [2012], Issues in Extraterritorial Application of Dodd-Frank`s Derivatives Rules.
Update with Focus on OTC Derivatives and Clearing Requirements, web.law.columbia.edu, dostęp
20/01/2015.
23. Gregory J. [2014], Central Counterparties. Mandatory Clearing and Bilateral Margin Requirements for
OTC Derivatives, Chichester, Wiley.
24. Hermans L., McGoldrick P., Schmiedel H. [2013], Central Counterparties and Systemic Risk,
“Macro-Prudential Commentaries”, No. 6, November.
25. Horii R., Yamamoto K., Ohdoi R. [2008], Financial Infrastructure Technological Shift, and Inequality
in Economic Development, MPRA Paper No. 7919.
26. IMF [2010], Global Financial Stability Report, IMF, April.
27. IMF [2011], Observance by LCH Clearnet Ltd of the CPSS-IOSCO Recommendations for Central
Counterparties – Detailed Assessment of Observance, IMF, July.
28. Jaskulla E.M. [2012], Werden zentrale Gegenparteien durch die Umsetzung von EMIR zum Risiko?
„Zeitschrift für Bank- und Kapitalmarktrecht“, No. 11.
29. Kaal W.A., Luppi B., Paterlini S. [2014], Did the Dodd-Frank Act Impact Hedge Funds Performance?,
MaCCI Law&Economics Conference “Financial Regulation and Competition”, University of
Mannheim and Centre of European Policy Studies, 5-7 November.
30. KNF [2014], Regulacja instrumentów pochodnych będących przedmiotem obrotu poza rynkiem regulowanym, kontrahentów centralnych i repozytoriów transakcji (EMIR), Warszawa, Komisja Nadzoru
Finansowego.
31. KPMG [2012], Neue Regulierung der OTC-Derivate in der EU und den USA, KPMG Luxembourg,
www.valueforfunds.lu/documents/emir-22-03-2012.pdf, dostęp 24/01/2015.
32. Kramer Levin [2012], Extraterritoriality of Dodd-Frank Act, www.eifr.eu/files/file1377819.pdf ,
dostęp 18/01/2015.
33. Lee R. [2010], The Governance of Financial Market Infrastructure, Oxford Finance Group, January.
34. Lees J.A. [2012], Derivatives Clearinghouses and Systemic Risk: A Bankruptcy and Dodd-Frank Analysis,
“Stanford Law Review”, Vol. 64, No. 4.
35. Minoiu C., Sharma S. [2014], Financial Networks Key to Understanding Systemic Risk, “Survey
Magazin”, IMF, 20 May.
36. Markose S. [2014], The Challenge, Multi-Agent Financial Network (MAFN). Models and Complexity
Perspective for Policy Design, Global Economic Symposium, www.global-economic-symposium.
org.
37. McNamara S. [2014], Financial Market Uncertainty and the Rawlsian Argument for Central Counterparty
Clearing of OTC Derivatives,”Notre Dame Journal od Law”, Ethics&Public Policy, Vol. 28,
Issue 1.
38. NBP [2013], Raport o stabilności systemu finansowego, Warszawa, Narodowy Bank Polski, grudzień.
39. NBP [2014], Rozwój systemu finansowego w Polsce w 2013 r., Warszawa, Narodowy Bank Polski.
40. Oatley T., Winecoff W.K., Pennock A., Bauerle Danzman S. [2013], The Political Economy of Global
Finance: A Network Model, “Perspectives on Politics”, Cambridge Journals, Vol. 11, Issue 01.
41. Peirce H. [2013], 10 Ways Dodd-Frank Will Hurt the Economy in 2013, “US News”, 7.01.
42. Portmann P., Bochud P. [2014], Banken und Effektenhändler – noch kein Ende der Regulierung in
Sicht. Aufsichtsrechtliche Entwicklungen, PWC Press, 05/02.
43. Rehlon A., Nixon D. [2013], Central Counterparties. What are they, why do they matter and how does
the bank supervise them?, “Quartely Bulletin”, No. 2, Bank of England.
44. Rinker M. [2003], Vertragsschluss im börslichen elektronischen Handelssystem, Berlin, Erich Schmidt
Verlag.
45. Schuster G., Ruschkowski A. [2014], EMIR – Überblick und ausgewählte Aspekte, „Zeitschrift für
Bankrecht und Bankwirtschaft”, No. 2.
46. Sidanius Ch., Wetherilt A. [2012], Thoughts on Determining Central Clearing Eligibility of OTC
Derivatives, “Financial Strategy Paper”, No. 14, Bank of England.
47. Sikorzewski W. [2011], EMIR i meandry regulacji, „Miesięcznik Finansowy Bank”, nr 4.
48. Sobolewski P., Tymoczko D. [2014], CCP – nowa jakość na rynku OTC, „Bank“, nr 3/55, marzec.
49. Summers B.J., Wells K.E. [2014], Governance of Payment Systems. A Theoretical Framework and
Cross-country Comparison,”Journal of Financial Markets Infrastructures”, No. 4.
50. Schillings R., Skolka T. [2012], Auswirkungen der EMIR auf die Deutsche Kreditwirtschaft: Herausforderungen
bei der Einführung von zentralen Kontrahenten für OTC-Derivate, „Banken Times
Spezial“, 06/07.
51. Yoshiya S., Central Clearing of OTC Derivatives – Protection of Cleared Swaps Customer Contracts
and Collateral, papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2037546, dostęp 21/01/2015.
Vertragsschluss an der Frankfurter Wertpapierbörse mittels des elektronischen Handelssystems Xetra unter
Einbeziehung einer Central Counterparty, Berlin, Dunckler Humblot.
2. Anderson R.W., Jõeveer K. [2014], The Economics of Collateral, London, London School of Economics
and Political Science, April.
3. Awrey D. [2011], Complexity, Innovation and the Regulation of Modern Financial Markets, ssrn.com/
abstract=1916649, dostęp 28/01/2015.
4. Bächstädt K.H., Pietrzak M. [2013], Kreditderivate: Auswirkungen der EMIR auf Hedging und Besicherung,
„Kredit & Rating. Praxis“, No. 5.
5. Berger R., Haag H., Andereeg P. [2013], Zinsderivateeinsatz in einer neu regulierten Welt, Joint Bond
Event: Schweizer Anleihenmarkt vor grosser Regulierungswelle, Zurcher Kantonalban, November 7.
6. Braithtwaite J.P. [2011], Public Law and the Public Law’s Central Counterparty. Prescription for the
Derivatives Market, papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1791740, dostęp 20/01/2015.
7. DBR [2010], US-Finanzmarktreform. Die Ökonomie des Dodd-Frank Acts, „Deutsche Bank Research“,
Dezember, No. 6.
8. EC [2014], Derivatives/EMIR, “Banking and Finance”, European Commission, ec.europa.eu,
dostęp 28/01/2015.
9. EC [2014], A Reformed Financial Sector for Europe, COM(2014) 279 final, European Commission,
Brussels.
10. ECB [2007], The Role of Central Counterparties. Issues Related to Central Counterparty Clearing,
ECB-FED Chicago Conference, European Central Bank, July.
11. Economides N. [1993], Network Economics with Application to Finance, “Financial Markets, Institutions
& Instruments”, Vol.2, No. 5.
12. Eckhardt P. [2012], EU-Verordnung MIFIR, CEP, Analyse, Nr. 16.04.
13. ESMA [2014], Post-trading/Clearing and Reporting EMIR, ESMA, www.esma.europa.eu/page/
post-trading, dostęp 20/01/2015.
14. Ferrarini G.A., Saguato P. [2014], Regulating Financial Market Infrastructure, European Corporate
Governance Institute, Law Working Paper No. 259/2014, June, 2014.
15. Fontaine J.S., Perez-Saiz H.P., Slive J. [2012], Competition and Strategic Control of the Central Counterparty.
When Lower Risk Increases Profit, Bank of Canada Working Paper, No. 35, November.
16. Fontaine J.S., Saiz H.P., Slive J. [2012], Access, Competition and Risk in Centrally Cleared Markets,
“Bank of Canada Review”, Autumn.
17. FSB [2012], OTC Derivatives Market Reforms: Third Progress Report on Implementation, Financial
Stability Board, June, Statement of the BIS Economic Consultative Committee, www.financialstabilityboard.
org/publications/r_120615.pdf, dostęp 20/01/2015.
18. FSI [2014], Financial System Inquiry. Final Report, Commonwealth of Australia, November.
19. Glasserman P., Peyton H.Y. [2013], How Likely is Contagion in Financial Networks?, University of
Oxford, Discussion Papers Series, No. 642, March, 2013.
20. Gomber P., Jäger B., MiFID: Eine systematische Analyse der Zielerreichung, „Zeitschrift für Bankrecht
und Bankwirtschaft”, 2014, No. 1.
21. Greenberger M., [2012], The Extraterritorial Provisions of the Dodd-Frank Act Protects U.S. Taxpayers
from Worldwide Bailouts, works.bepress.com/michael_greenberger/47/, dostęp 20/01/2015.
22. Greene E.F., Potiha I. [2012], Issues in Extraterritorial Application of Dodd-Frank`s Derivatives Rules.
Update with Focus on OTC Derivatives and Clearing Requirements, web.law.columbia.edu, dostęp
20/01/2015.
23. Gregory J. [2014], Central Counterparties. Mandatory Clearing and Bilateral Margin Requirements for
OTC Derivatives, Chichester, Wiley.
24. Hermans L., McGoldrick P., Schmiedel H. [2013], Central Counterparties and Systemic Risk,
“Macro-Prudential Commentaries”, No. 6, November.
25. Horii R., Yamamoto K., Ohdoi R. [2008], Financial Infrastructure Technological Shift, and Inequality
in Economic Development, MPRA Paper No. 7919.
26. IMF [2010], Global Financial Stability Report, IMF, April.
27. IMF [2011], Observance by LCH Clearnet Ltd of the CPSS-IOSCO Recommendations for Central
Counterparties – Detailed Assessment of Observance, IMF, July.
28. Jaskulla E.M. [2012], Werden zentrale Gegenparteien durch die Umsetzung von EMIR zum Risiko?
„Zeitschrift für Bank- und Kapitalmarktrecht“, No. 11.
29. Kaal W.A., Luppi B., Paterlini S. [2014], Did the Dodd-Frank Act Impact Hedge Funds Performance?,
MaCCI Law&Economics Conference “Financial Regulation and Competition”, University of
Mannheim and Centre of European Policy Studies, 5-7 November.
30. KNF [2014], Regulacja instrumentów pochodnych będących przedmiotem obrotu poza rynkiem regulowanym, kontrahentów centralnych i repozytoriów transakcji (EMIR), Warszawa, Komisja Nadzoru
Finansowego.
31. KPMG [2012], Neue Regulierung der OTC-Derivate in der EU und den USA, KPMG Luxembourg,
www.valueforfunds.lu/documents/emir-22-03-2012.pdf, dostęp 24/01/2015.
32. Kramer Levin [2012], Extraterritoriality of Dodd-Frank Act, www.eifr.eu/files/file1377819.pdf ,
dostęp 18/01/2015.
33. Lee R. [2010], The Governance of Financial Market Infrastructure, Oxford Finance Group, January.
34. Lees J.A. [2012], Derivatives Clearinghouses and Systemic Risk: A Bankruptcy and Dodd-Frank Analysis,
“Stanford Law Review”, Vol. 64, No. 4.
35. Minoiu C., Sharma S. [2014], Financial Networks Key to Understanding Systemic Risk, “Survey
Magazin”, IMF, 20 May.
36. Markose S. [2014], The Challenge, Multi-Agent Financial Network (MAFN). Models and Complexity
Perspective for Policy Design, Global Economic Symposium, www.global-economic-symposium.
org.
37. McNamara S. [2014], Financial Market Uncertainty and the Rawlsian Argument for Central Counterparty
Clearing of OTC Derivatives,”Notre Dame Journal od Law”, Ethics&Public Policy, Vol. 28,
Issue 1.
38. NBP [2013], Raport o stabilności systemu finansowego, Warszawa, Narodowy Bank Polski, grudzień.
39. NBP [2014], Rozwój systemu finansowego w Polsce w 2013 r., Warszawa, Narodowy Bank Polski.
40. Oatley T., Winecoff W.K., Pennock A., Bauerle Danzman S. [2013], The Political Economy of Global
Finance: A Network Model, “Perspectives on Politics”, Cambridge Journals, Vol. 11, Issue 01.
41. Peirce H. [2013], 10 Ways Dodd-Frank Will Hurt the Economy in 2013, “US News”, 7.01.
42. Portmann P., Bochud P. [2014], Banken und Effektenhändler – noch kein Ende der Regulierung in
Sicht. Aufsichtsrechtliche Entwicklungen, PWC Press, 05/02.
43. Rehlon A., Nixon D. [2013], Central Counterparties. What are they, why do they matter and how does
the bank supervise them?, “Quartely Bulletin”, No. 2, Bank of England.
44. Rinker M. [2003], Vertragsschluss im börslichen elektronischen Handelssystem, Berlin, Erich Schmidt
Verlag.
45. Schuster G., Ruschkowski A. [2014], EMIR – Überblick und ausgewählte Aspekte, „Zeitschrift für
Bankrecht und Bankwirtschaft”, No. 2.
46. Sidanius Ch., Wetherilt A. [2012], Thoughts on Determining Central Clearing Eligibility of OTC
Derivatives, “Financial Strategy Paper”, No. 14, Bank of England.
47. Sikorzewski W. [2011], EMIR i meandry regulacji, „Miesięcznik Finansowy Bank”, nr 4.
48. Sobolewski P., Tymoczko D. [2014], CCP – nowa jakość na rynku OTC, „Bank“, nr 3/55, marzec.
49. Summers B.J., Wells K.E. [2014], Governance of Payment Systems. A Theoretical Framework and
Cross-country Comparison,”Journal of Financial Markets Infrastructures”, No. 4.
50. Schillings R., Skolka T. [2012], Auswirkungen der EMIR auf die Deutsche Kreditwirtschaft: Herausforderungen
bei der Einführung von zentralen Kontrahenten für OTC-Derivate, „Banken Times
Spezial“, 06/07.
51. Yoshiya S., Central Clearing of OTC Derivatives – Protection of Cleared Swaps Customer Contracts
and Collateral, papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2037546, dostęp 21/01/2015.