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Artykuł dotyczy uwarunkowań instytucjonalnych i behawioralnych publicznej regulacji rynku z perspektywy organów regulacyjnych działających w Polsce. Przyjmując, że regulacja jest instytucją formalną określającą reguły gry rynkowej wykazano, że wynikające z niej biurokracja oraz formalne modele współpracy mają znaczenie jako bariery relacji regulator – przedsiębiorstwa. W przypadku instytucji nieformalnych wykazano, że zdecydowanie bardziej taką barierą jest brak zaufania pomiędzy regulatorem i przedsiębiorstwami niż brak uczciwości ich działań. Znaczenie uwarunkowań instytucjonalnych w większości przypadków okazało się niezależne od rynku podlegającego regulacji. Badania wykazały równocześnie, że urzędnicy organów regulacyjnych częściej ulegają efektowi pewności, efektowi unikania strat i efektowi odbicia zgodnie z teorią perspektywy oraz efektowi asymetrycznej dominacji i efektowi kalibracji, a rzadziej efektowi status quo oraz efektowi ponadprzeciętności i efektowi nadmiernej pewności siebie. Zakres występowania efektów behawioralnych okazał się, w pewnym zakresie, zależny od organu regulacyjnego.
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Prawa autorskie (c) 2025 Piotr Szkudlarek
Utwór dostępny jest na licencji Creative Commons Uznanie autorstwa 4.0 Międzynarodowe.
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Więcej informacji: Polityka Open Access czasopisma "Studia z Polityki Publicznej/Public Policy Studies"
Referencje
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Referencje
Alam, N. 2022. Moral Hazard Problem in Public Policymakers, European Scientific Journal, Vol. 19,
No. 7: 296–317.
Almlöf, H., Bjuggren, P.O., 2019. A regulation and transaction cost perspective on the design of corporate law, European Journal of Law and Economics, Vol. 47: 407–433.
Alós-Ferrer, C., Granic, G.D. 2023. Does choice change preferences? An incentivized test of the mere choice effect, Experimental Economics, Vol. 26: 499–521.
Arceneaux, K., Nicholson, S.P. 2024. Anchoring Political Preferences: The Psychological Foundations of Status Quo Bias and the Boundaries of Elite Manipulation, Political Behavior, Vol. 46:751–775.
Balawi, A., Ayoub, A. 2023. A Review of the Main Differences Between Behavioral and Traditional Economics: a Focus on the Impact of Nudge Theory on Public Policies and its Applications, Modern Management Review, Vol. 28, No. 4: 17–31.
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& Governance, Vol. 11, Issue 1: 95–108.
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Ortoleva, P., Snowberg, E. 2015. Overconfidence in Political Behavior, The American Economic Review,
Vol. 105, No. 2: 504–535.
Öztuna, A. 2023. The New Political Economy of Regulation, Modern Economy, Vol. 14, No. 4: 323–346.
Panda, B., Leepsa, N.M. 2017. Agency Theory: Review of Theory and Evidence on Problems and Perspectives, Indian Journal of Corporate Governance, Vol. 10, No. 1: 74–95.
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No. 2: 7–17.
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