Central Bank Digital Currencies (CBDC) in the context of the disintermediation risk of the banking sector
DOI:
https://doi.org/10.33119/SIP.2023.192.7Keywords:
CBDC, disintermediation of banks, monetary policyAbstract
The aim of the article is to verify the validity of the thesis on the disintermediation of banks as a consequence of introducing the Central Bank Digital Currency (CBDC) and to determine how the impact of the CBDC on bank disintermediation can be programmed. The analysis indicates that regardless of the adopted research concept and the shape of the financial sector, the risk of structural bank disintermediation is always present. Previous studies in this area have often provided different recommendations and require further exploration or cautious interpretation. At the same time, the spectre of disintermediation can be mitigated by using quantitative instruments that regulate the interest rates on the CBDC, imposing transaction size limits, and setting limits on the amount of funds held by individual users of digital currencies. From the perspective of the objectives set for the CBDC, adjustments in monetary policy such as replenishing lost bank deposits with wholesale funding provided by the central bank (e.g. through programmes like TLTRO) may be more appropriate.
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