Tender offer premium on the capital market in Poland
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Abstract
Recent years on the Polish capital market has been difficult for investors. More companies are subject to the delisting procedure than new ones appear under the IPO. Delisting often takes place in conjunction with a takeover of a company and an announcement of a tender offer for all its shares. The aim of the article is to characterise the processes of tender offers for the shares of companies listed on the Warsaw Stock Exchange and to examine the level of price premiums offered to shareholders. This aim will be achieved by analysing the secondary data for tender offer transactions on the Warsaw Stock Exchange in the years 2016-2018. The article presents the main hypothesis: the control premium paid by the inviting entity during the examined period was over 25% of the average share price for the last six months preceding the tender offer. After the analysis, it turned out that the hypothesis was verified negatively, because in one third of the examined cases the premium was below one percent in relation to the examined average preceding the tender offer. The lack of premium may be caused by the weakness of the domestic market, visible in the absence of capital inflow, which makes tender offers an opportunity to remodel the investment portfolio.
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